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SEARCHING FOR AN EFFICACIOUS JOINT
INVENTORSHIP STANDARD
Abstract: Congress's 1984 amendments to 35 U.S.C. § 116 lowered the
bar for establishing joint inventorship of a patent. but (lid not clarify the
uncertainty' inherent in joint inventorship law. The crux of this
uncertainty is the ability of a person to become a joint inventor because
of a minor contribution to an invention and, thus, to obtain ownership
rights commensurate with those of more significant contributors. This
circumstance obscures the respective rights of researchers, enables
dubious legal arguments regarding those rights, mandates unnecessary
legal involvement in the research process, and inhibits research
collaboration. This Note reviews current joint inventorship and joint
ONVI1 ership law and evaluates potential reforms. The Note concludes that.
a judicial "matrix approach" to joint inventorship, incorporating clear
rules adapted to specific contextual concerns, would best achievethe
policies and goals of patent law.
INTRODUCTION
In patent, law, joint inventorship is a notoriously slippery con-
cept.' Who really knows how to partition accurately the mental
achievements of two brainstorming inventors? How can a court dis-
tinguish the contributions of a true collaborator from the suggestions
of an able associate whose ideas nevertheless do not materially ad-
vance the inventor's idea? 2
 Not surprisingly, the law of joint inventor-
ship has always had vague guidelines, attaching legal significance to
an abstract event, adhering to a metaphysical standard that deems an
I Mueller Brass Co. v. Reading Indus., 352 F. Stipp. 1357, 1372 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (de-
scribing joint inventorship as "one of the muddiest concepts in the muddy metaphysics of
patent law"); DoNnun S. CHISUP.I, Cli [SUM ON PATENTS § 2.02121, at 2-4 to 2-5 (release no.
81 Dec. 2001); see Fritz Fasse, The Muddy Metaphysics of faint Inventolship: Cleaning Up After
the 1984 Amendments to 35 U.S.C. § 116, 5 HAFtv. J.L. & 'atm. 153, 153 (1992); see also Gary
A. Clark & Jeanine L. Hayes, Out offoint, L.A. DAmv .J., Apr. 24, 1997, at S8; Robert J. Lau-
son & Bruce B. Brunda, Federal Court Decisions Attempt to Settle Joint Inventorship Questions,
Wel. 1,J., Oct..31, 1994, at C12; Jeffrey G. Sheldon & Damon K. Mak, What Contributions
Mahe You a Joint Inventor'?, L.A. DA11.11, Oct. 16, 1994, at 7.
2
 See Omura , supra note 1, § 2.02[21, at 2-4 to 2-5; Fasse, supra note 1, at 153, 160-61,
206-07; see also Clark & Hayes, supra note 1, at S8; Lauson & Brunda, supra note 1, at C12;
Sheldon & Mak. supra note 1, at 7.
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inventor's "moment of conception" the badge of inventorship. 3 These
types of rules have often been difficult to apply. 4 Yet, courts have long
required a minimum threshold of contribution to qualify as a joint
inventor: one had to contribute in an original manner to the concep-
tion of an idea, not merely exhibit the knowledge of one skilled in an
inventive art. 5
 Then, in 1984, Congress amended 35 U.S.C. § 116,
which deals with the naming of joint inventors, and made it easier to
include members of a large research team as joint inventors on a pat-
ent. 6 In so doing, it lowered the bar for joint inventorship status but
did not clarify any of the inherent uncertainty in joint inventorship
law.7 At the same time, no change was made to 35 U.S.C. § 262, the
separate section concerning joint ownership of patents. 8 Under that
provision, joint inventors each receive an equal bundle of ownership
rights, regardless of the quality or quantity of their contributions to
the patented subject matter.9 Joint owners each own an undivided
share in the whole patent as tenants in common." ) Joint owners may
unilaterally license or assign their interest in the patent without ac-
counting to other owners.n Furthermore, because all joint owners are
necessary parties to a suit for patent infringement and may not be in-
voluntarily joined, a joint owner can essentially prevent other joint
3 See Culsum, supra note 1, §2.02[2), at 2-4 to 2-5; Fasse, supra note 1, at 153, 160-61,
206-07; see also Clark & Hayes, supra note 1, at 58; Lauson & Brunda, supra note 1, at C12;
Sheldon & Mak, supra note 1, at 7.
See II-Mellen 352 F. Stipp. at 1372; Fasse, supra note 1, at 153; sec also Clark & Hayes, su-
pra note 1, at 58; Lauson & Brunda, supra note 1, at C12; Sheldon & Mak, supra note I, at
7.
5 See Cntsum, supra note 1, § 2.02[2], at 2-5 to 2-7 (providing a general description of
the requirements for joint invention and a range of historical cases).
6 See 35 U.S.C. § 116 (2000); 130 Cow,. REC. 28,073 (1984) (statement of Rep. Ras-
teruneier).
7 Sec Etincon, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 135 F.3d 1456, 1469 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Fasse,
supra note 1, at 153.
n See 35 U,S.C. § 262.
9 See id,
1 See Ethicon, 135 F.3d at 1465-66; Robert P. Merges & Lawrence A. Locke, Co-
Ownership of Patents: A Comparative and Economic View, 72 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK O rr. Soc 'v
586, 586-87 (1990).
II 35 U.S.C. § 262. An assignment of patent rights often occurs when an employee is
obligated, pursuant to an agreement prior to any patentable work, to give all patent rights
to an employer. An assignment entails a conveyance of the entire interest in the patent. On
the other hand, a license is a contractual agreement, usually consununated after the patent
issues, which carves out a lesser interest in the patent, perhaps licensing a particular use of
the patented invention. An important difference is the ability to sublicense further—an
assignee owns the patent and so is free to license at will, whereas a licensee is bound by the
terms of the license, which typically will not allow a sublicense without the licensor's con-
sent.
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owners from suing an infringer. 12 Lax joint inventorship rules, a result
of the 1984 amendments, now coexist with polar joint ownership
rules, which Congress left unchanged." Thus, the crux of the contro-
versy over joint liven iorship doctrine is the following inequity: under
current law, a person may become a joint inventor because of a minor
contribution to an invention, yet obtain ownership rights commensu-
rate with every other joint inventor on the patent."
What are the consequences of this situation? Given the minimal
and rather vague, thus unpredictable, standards for determining in-
ventorship, the current state of the law fosters uncertainty and appre-
hension regarding the contributions of various researchers or team
members participating in the inventive process." In recent years, a
claim of joint inventorship has become an attractive option for dis-
gruntled scientists suing either their former research partners or for-
mer employers." Likewise, defendants accused of infringement. might
endeavor to find an unnamed, overlooked and minor contributor to
defeat a claim of infringement." This tactic is twofold: the unnamed
contributor, if found to be a valid joint inventor and joint owner, can
either refuse to join the suit or can grant a license to the defendant to
continue using the patented technology and thus defeat the suit;"
alternatively, the defendant can assert that the patent is invalid for
failing to name the correct inventors. 19
 Tints, the very purpose of the
13 See Ethicon, 135 F.3d at 1467-68; Dale L. Carlson & James R. Barney, The Division of
Rights Among Joint Inventors: Public Policy Concerns After Ethicon v. U.S. Surgical, 39 IDEA
251, 260 (1999).
13 See Ethicon, 135 F.3d at 1468, 1471-72; Carlson & Barney, supra note 12, at 253, 263,
266.
14
 See, e.g., Ethicon, 135 F.3d at 1469-71; Carlson & Barney, supra note 12, at 263;
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Collaborative Research: Conflicts on Authorship, Ownership, and
Accountability, 53 VAND. L. Ri:v. 1161, 1211-14 (2000).
15 See, e.g., Lawrence Sung, Collegiality and Collaboration in the Age of Exclusivity, 3 DEPAIn.
J. HEALTH CARE L. 411, 438-39 (2000); see Clark & Hayes, supra note 1, at S8; Lauson &
Brenda, supra note 1, at C12; Antonio Regalado, Research, Red Ink: An Academic Group Seeks
Balance, WALL ST. J., Jan. 14, 2002, at 134; Sheldon & Mak, supra note 1, at 7.
16
 Philip Konecny, Comment, Windfall Property Rights for the Left Out Co-Inventor Who Gets
Let into the Patent, 16 SANTA CLARA COAIPUTER & HIGH TECH. LJ., 141, 172-73 (1999); see
Ethicon, 135 F.3d at 1472; Sung, supra note 15, at 435. Most of the cases cited in this Note
deal with such a suit.
17
 Konecny, supra note 16, at 173; see Ethicon, 135 F.3d at 1468, 1472; see also James R.
Barney & Dale L. Carlson, "Uncorrectability" as an Affirmative Defense Against Patent Infringe-
ment: Managing the Burden of Proof 8 FED. CIR. B.J. 23, 33 (1999).
18 See Ethicon, 135 F.3d at 1468, 1472; Barney & Carlson, supra note 17, at 33; Konecny,
supra note 16, at 173.
19 35 U.S.C. § 102(f) (2000); see Pannu v. Iolab Corp., 155 F.3d 1344, 1350-51 (Fed.
Cir. 1998) (if patentee does not claim relief under 35 U.S.C. § 256, court should hold pat-
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1984 amendments has been turned on its ear—refurbished § 116, de-
signed to encourage team research, may now be impeding it. 2°
This Note discusses the current law of joint inventorship and how
it might be modified to solve this problem and to promote collabora-
tive research more effectively. Part ILA. focuses on the three sections
of the patent code that are the primary source of the law on joint in-
ventorship and joint ownership." It also examines interpretive case
law for each provision. Part MAI discusses § 116, which allows for
naming joint inventors on a patent. 22 Part II.A.1. also discusses the
important amendments made to § 116 in 1984. 23 Part II.A.2. discusses
35 U.S.C. § 256, which allows a court to order the correction of an
issued patent by adding, deleting, or modifying the named inven-
tors.24 Part II.A.3. discusses § 262, which grants extensive rights to
joint owners of a patent. 25 Part II.B. describes in detail the seminal
case Ethicon, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical, which created much of the existing
joint inventorship problem. 26 Part II.C. explores the ramifications of
Ethicon and the effect of the problem on collaborative research." Part
II.D. summarizes the types of solutions that have been proposed. 28
Part III.A. argues that amending joint inventorship rules is a better
solution than amending joint ownership rules. 29 Finally, Part
explores the most efficacious form of joint. inventorship rules. 3°
ent invalid for failure to comply with 35 U.S.C. g 102(0); Jamesbury Corp. v. United States,
518 F.2d 1384, 1395 (Ct. Cl. 1975) (inclusion of more or less than the true inventors in
patent renders it void); Amax Fly Ash Corp. v. United States, 514 F.2d 1041, 1050 (Ct. Cl.
1975); Barney & Carlson, supra note 17, at 24. An error in inventorship may sometimes be
corrected pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 256. See 35 U.S.C. § 256; Paulin, 155 F.3d at 1350.
20 See Sung, supra note 15, at 439.
21 Sec infra notes 31-151 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 38-110 and accompanying text.
23 See infra notes 38-110 and accompanying text.
24 See infra notes 111-138 and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 139-151 and accompanying text.
20 Sce infra notes 152-187 and accompanying text.
27 See infra notes 188-223 and accompanying text.
28 See infra notes 224-264 and accompanying text.
29 Sec infra notes 265-308 and accompanying text.
30 See infra notes 309-373 and accompanying text.
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I. BACKGROUND
A. Law of Joint Inventorship and faint Ownership
Whoever invents patentable subject matter is entitled to a patent
thereon.V This principle derives from the U.S. Constitution's grant of
Congressional authority It] o promote the progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." 32
When an invention is made by two or more persons jointly, they must
apply for a patent jointly." The law of joint inventorship and owner-
ship is embodied primarily in three sections of Title 35 of the U.S.
Code:* § 116 deals with the definition of joint inventors;" § 256 al-
lows for the correction of a patent which improperly names or omits
an inventor;" § 262 concerns joint ownership of patents. 37
1. 35 U.S.C. § 116—Joint Inventorship
Joint inventorship is governed by 35 U.S.C. § 116, which indicates
in pertinent part:
When an invention is made by two or more persons jointly,
they shall apply for a patent jointly and each make the re-
quired oath, except as otherwise provided in this title. Inven-
tors may apply for a patent jointly even though (1) they did
not physically work together or at the same time, (2) each
did not make the same type or amount of contribution, or
(3) each did not make a contribution to the subject matter
of every claim of the patent."
35 U.S.C. § 101; Hess v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., 106 F.3d 976, 979 (Fed. Cir.
1997).
32 U.S. CONST. an
 1, § 8, cl, S.
33 35 U.S.C. § 116.
Id. §§ 116, 256, 262. For a further discussion of joint inventorship, and particularly
the 1984 amendments to §§ 116 and 103, see Fasse, supra note 1.
35 35 U.S.C. § 116.
36
 Id, § 256.
37 Id, § 262.
38
 Id, § 116. The scope of protected intellectual property in a patent is defined by the
claims. There is no limit to the allowable number of claims, though many are duplicative
in coverage but contain slightly varying language to provide reliable protection. See U.S.
PATENT Re TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL. OF PATF.NT EXAMINING PROCEDURE. § 706.03(k)
(8th ed. 2001) [hereinafter MANUAL].
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This section provides no explicit quantitative or qualitative lower limit
to the amount of inventive contribution required to qualify one as a
joint inventor." As the statutory text implies, a joint inventor is only
required to perform part of the task that produces the invention and
to contribute to one claim. 40
The test for inventorship under § 116  turns on the notion of an
inventor's "conception."41 One leading writer has supplied the follow-
ing easy-to-read, difficult-to-apply articulation of the joint inventorship
standard: "joint invention occurs when two or more persons, collabo-
rating together, each contribute to the conception of the solution to a
problem which constitutes the invention." 42 Therefore, only where a
single, unitary idea is the product of two or more minds, working in
communication with one another, is the conception truly joint. 45 As
courts have emphasized, "[C]onception is the touchstone of inventor-
ship.'" "Conception is the formation in the mind of the inventor of a
definite and permanent idea of the complete and operative invention,
as it. is thereafter to be applied in practice." 45 An inventor need not
33 Fina Oil & Chem. Co. v. Ewen, 123 F.3d 1466, 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Burroughs
Wellcome Co. v. Barr Lab., 40 F.3d 1223, 1227 (Fed. Cir. 1994); see 35 U.S.C. § 116.
4° See Ethicon, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 135 F.3d 1456, 1460 (Fed, Cir. 1998). In fact,
contributing to the invention of one disclosed means of a mean-plus-function claim
qualifies one as a joint inventor, unless the means was simply a perfunctory reduction to
practice of the sole inventor's broader concept. See Winbond Elec. Corp. v. Intl Trade
Comm'n, 262 F.3d 1363, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Ethicon, 135 F.3d at 1463; see also Sewall v.
Walters, 21 F.3d 411, 416 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (holding designer of one disclosed means was
not joint inventor because inventive aspect of claim did not encompass particular means
for reducing it to practice). A means-phis-function claim describes an invention in terms of
the function performed rather than structure. Alternate means for performing that func-
tion are disclosed in the specification of the patent; the patent protects these alternate
methods and their equivalents. An example might be "means for attaching two surfaces."
This claim would protect the invention regardless of the "means" used for attachment—
the surfaces could be glued, taped, nailed, screwed together, and so on. See 35 U.S.C. § 112
1 6; see also, e.g., Ethical, 135 F.3d at 1462-64 (providing examples of means-plus-function
claims and explaining the significance of a means-phis-function claim in the context of
joint inventorship). See generally Citisum, supra note 1, § 18.03[5].
See Ethicon, 135 F.3d at 1460; Finn, 123 F.3d at 1473; Burroughs, 40 F.3d at 1227-28.
42 CHISUM, supra note 1, § 2.0212j, at 2-5. This definition of joint inventorship sum-
marizes the law of many older invest torship cases. Fasse, supra note 1, at 160-61, n.39.
43 See CIIISUM, supra note 1, § 2.02[2], at 2-5 n.3 (quoting 1 WILLIAM C. ROBINSON,
THE LAW or PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS § 396 (1890)).
" Acromed Corp. v. Sofamor Danek Group, Inc., 253 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2001);
Ethical, 135 F.3d at 1460; Firia, 123 F.3d at 1473; Burroughs, 40 F.3d at 1227-28.
43 Ethicon, 135 F.3d at 1460 (quoting ROBINSON, supra note 43, § 532). The inventive
process is said to comprise both conception and reduction to practice. Conception is the
mental act of formulating an idea, particular and definite. Reduction to practice is the
process of transforming an intangible idea into a working physical reality. Ethical, 135 F.3d
at 1460. Filing a proper patent application with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
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know an invention will work in practice to achieve conception—realiz-
ing a working invention is part of the separate step of reduction to
practice. 46
 Accordingly, each person claiming to be a joint inventor
must contribute to the conception of the invention, 47 The contribu-
tion must be significant and inventive; merely explaining well-known
principles or the current state of the art does not make one a joint
inventor.48
 Conception is complete when an idea is sufficiently
definite and permanent such that one with ordinary skill in the art
could reduce it to practice. 49
 Because completed conception connotes
completed invention, one who merely exhibits ordinary skill in the art
and reduces an invention to practice after conception is not a joint
inventor." Similarly, exhibiting ordinary skill in performing tests or
experiments, assisting the sole inventor, or acting at the sole inven-
tor's specific instructions does not qualify one as a joint inventor. 51 in
(USPTO) is considered constructive reduction to practice—that is, a patent application
that properly discloses an invention is considered to have been conceived and reduced to
practice, regardless of whether the inventor made, or ever makes, the invention. Cooper v.
Goldfarb, 154 F,3d 1321, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Hybritech Inc. V. Monoclonal Antibodies,
Inc., 802 F,2d 1367, 1376 (Fed• Cir. 1986). Courts have also referred to the doctrine of
"simultaneous conception and reduction to practice," albeit sparingly, for cases involving
experimental sciences. In a field such as pharmaceutical research, researchers often can-
not discern the feasibility of an idea until after conducting rounds of testing and reducing
the invention to practice. Conception is not considered complete, tinder this theory, until
experimentation proves out the concept. But this does not mean a purported inventor
must always wait until experimentation—a sufficiently definite and permanent idea—be-
fore testing is sometimes enough to connote inventorship. See Burroughs, 40 F.3d at 1228-
29. Arguably, this standard of "simultaneous" conception and reduction to practice should
be applied to the biomedical and other experimental fields, whereas the usual standard
requiring a "definite and permanent idea" ought to be restricted to predictive or engineer-
ing sciences. See generally Jackie Hotter, Note, A Definite and Permanent Idea? Invention in the
Pharmaceutical and Chemical Science and the Determination of Conception in Patent Law, 28 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 687 (1995) (exploring the advantages of the simultaneous reduction to
practice doctrine in the pharmaceutical industry). For a discussion on the level of "con-
ceptual specificity" needed to connote inventorship, see generally David W. Carstens, Joint
Inventorship Under 35 U.S.C. § 116, 73,J. PAT. & TRADEMARK On'. Soc'v 616 (1991) (propos-
ing conceptual specificity as a requirement for joint inventorship).
40 Burroughs. 40 F.3d at 1228.
47
 Acromed, 253 F.3d at 1379; Pannu v. blab Corp., 155 F.3d 1344, 1351 (Fed• Cir.
1998); MM. 123 F.3d at 1473; see Ethicon, 135 F,3d at 1460.
4° Acromed, 253 F.3(1 at 1379; see Ethicon, 135 F.3d at 1460; Hess, 106 F.3d at 981.
49
 Ethical, 135 F.3d at 1460; Burroughs, 40 F,3d at 1228; Small, 21 F.3d at 415.
6° Pannu, 155 F.3d at 1351; Ethicon, 135 E3c1 at 1460; Fina, 123 F.3d at 1473.
L
 Hess, 106 F.3d at 981; see Ethicon, 135 F.3d at 1460; see also Shatterproof Glass Corp. V.
LibberOwens Ford Co., 758 F.2d 613, 616 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (holding that an inventor may
use the services, ideas, and aid of others in the process of perfecting the inventor's inven-
tions without losing the right to a patent).
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1998, in Patina v. blab alp., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit summarized these requirements:
All that is required is that [the joint inventor] (1) contribute
in some significant manner to the conception or reduction
to practice of the invention, (2) make a contribution to the
claimed invention that is not insignificant in quality, when
that contribution is measured against the dimension of the
full invention, and (3) do more than merely explain to the
real inventors well-known concepts and/or the current state
of the art."
Nevertheless, given this explanation of what it means to conceive of
an invention, the law of joint inventorship for patents is relatively un-
clear." The principles just described are difficult to apply—especially
for a judge who may be unfamiliar with a particular technology and
with what type of contribution might be "significant" in that technol-
ogy.54 Thus, those who contribute very little to an invention may still
be considered joint inven tors. 55
In addition, courts have promulgated one further guideline: the
requirement of collaboration. 56 Courts have interpreted § 116 to in-
chide a requirement of collaboration between joint inventors, though
there is no mandate that joint inventors work together physically or
work simultaneously. 57 To collaborate, joint inventors must be working
towards the same end, on the same subject matter, and producing an
invention by their aggregate efforts." In Pannu, the Federal Circuit
found the inventor of a snag-resistant intraocular lens" to have col-
laborated with the president of a lens making company, who sug-
gested he use single-piece technology in fabricating his lenses.° The
president also supplied the inventor with prototype lenses, which the
52 155 F.3d at 1351.
53 See Ethicon, 135 F.3d at 1469-71.
54 See id.
55 See id.
ss Fina, 123 F.3d at 1473; Burroughs, 40 F.3(1 at 1227; Kimberly-Clark Corp, v. Procter
Gamble Distrib, Co., 973 F.2(1 911, 916-17 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
57 Burroughs, 40 F.3d at 1227; Kimberly-Clark, 973 F.2d at 916-17.
5(S
	
973 F.2d at 916; Monsanto Co. v. Kamp, 269 F. Stipp. 818, 824 (D.D.C.
1967); sec also Credle v. Bond, 25 F.3d 1566, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (holding that there can
be no collaboration and no joint invention if one inventor conceives and reduces to prac-
tice, in non-overlapping time period, before other inventor).
59 The intraocular lens at issue was a plastic lens that could, for example, be surgically
inserted into the eye to replace a failed natural lens. Pannu. 155 F.3d at 1346.
89 Id. at 1346, 1351.
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inventor tested." The snag-resistant features of the lens were already
in a patent application before any collaboration, but the inventor
then filed a continuation-in-part and added the one-piece technology
feature to a .claim. 62 The Federal Circuit found this contact enough to
constitute collaboration, even though one inventive step was taken
before the other, and contact between the individuals was limited in
scope. 63
If two parties are wholly unaware of each other's work, however,
there can be no collaboration and no joint invention." In 1992, in
Kimberly-Clark. Corp. v. Procter & Gamble Distribribuling Co., the Federal
Circuit held that. three inventors who worked at the same company
and developed very similar products were not joint inventors on the
same patent because they were not aware of each other's work. 65 The
defendant in Kimberly-Clark, trying to obtain the benefit of an earlier
priority date,66
 argued that the patent. in question was the product of a
joint invention made by three of its employees, who had done work in
different years. 67 None of the employees knew of each other's work
(indeed, one worked at a different facility in Germany) until three or
four years after the patent issued. 68 In rejecting this argument, the
Federal Circuit interpreted § 116 to mean that an invention can be
made jointly only if two or more persons collaborate in creating it. 69
The Federal Circuit found no examples of joint behavior, such as one
inventor reading a relevant report and building upon it, or hearing
another's suggestion at. a meeting."
61 Id. at 1346.
62 Id. A continuation-in-part application is an extension of the application process, al-
lowing an inventor to claim new subject matter in a patent application while retaining the
benefit of the same (earlier) filing date for the patent. MANUAL, SUPfri note 38, § 201.08,
201.11; RONALD it. H HAMM], PATENT LAW: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE § 4:3,3(C] (3rd ed.,
release 3, 2001).
69 See Pannu. 155 F.3d at 1351.
64 See Kimberly-Clark, 973 F.2d at 916-17.
See id. at 915-17.
66 A priority date is usually the date at which an inventor conceives of an invention, un-
less the inventor is not diligent in reducing the invention to practice (either by actually
making a prototype of the invention or by filing with the USYTO). Sec 35 U.S.C. § 101
(2000); Cnisum, supra note 1, § 10.01. If an inventor is not diligent, a second inventor who
conceives later but reduces to practice first may be named the inventor. Id. In the United
States, the first person to invent is legally entitled to a patent, whereas in most other coun-
tries the first to file is entitled. Id.
67 Kimberly-Clark 973 F.2d at 913.
68 Id.
69 Sec id. at 915-17.
7° Id. at 917.
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The legislative history of § 116 provides insight as to why the sec-
tion has such minimal joint inventorship requirements: 71 Congress
last substantially amended § 116 in 1984.72 In enacting these amend-
ments, Congress was primarily concerned with accommodating the
modern paradigm of the research and development team at a corpo-
ration, university, or other large organization: 73 Such research teams,
particularly in the biomedical industry, are often large in number and
develop products that may take years to mature. 74 As a consequence,
researchers may work on a particular project over a long period of
time, sometimes sporadically, and each team member's quantitative
contributions to the final invention may vary. 75 With the 1984
amendments, Congress attempted to encourage team research by
codifying certain rules existing in the case law and thereby preventing
courts from moving in an unfavorable direction. 75 Specifically, Con-
gress adopted the joint inventorship definition in Monsanto Co. v.
Kamp and the "non-all-claims" rule in SAB Industri AB v. Bendix corp.77
First, to foster communication and collegiality between and
within large teams, Congress explicitly adopted the rationale of Mon-
71 See generally Patent Law Amendments Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-662, § 104(a), 98 Stat.
3383, 3384 (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 1l6 (2000)); Comm. OF TOE JUDICIARY, 98T11 CONG.,
SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS OF H.R. 6286, PATENT LAW AM ENDMENTS ACT OF I 9 8 1, 130
CONE. REc. 28,069 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5827 [hereinafter SrcrioN-By-
ScurtoN ANALYSIS].
72 35 U.S.C. § 116; Patent Law Amendments Act § 104(a).
75 SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS, 130 CONG. REC. 28,071, reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5833-34; see 130 CONG. REC. 28,073 (1984) (remarks of Rep. Kastenineier
in introducing the bill to the House of Representatives for a vote); 130 CoNG. REC.
£34,803 (1983) (remarks of Rep. Kastenmeier during drafting of the bill).
74 Sec Sung, supra note 15, at 416, 419; see also, e.g., Burroughs, 40 F.3d at 1225-27; Gen.
Motors Corp. v. Toyota Motor Co., 467 F. Supp. 1142, 1150-51 (S.D. Ohio 1979) [hereinaf-
ter Gen. Motors I].
75 See SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS, 130 CONE. REC. 28,071, reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5833-34; see Sung, supra note 15, at 438-39.
76 See SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS, 130 CONG. REC. 28,071, reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5833-34; Innovation and Patent Law Reform: Hearing on H.R. 3285, H.R.
3236, and H.R. 3605 Before the House Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Admin. of Jus-
tice, Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 6, 28-29 (1984) [hereinafter Hearings) (testimony of
Gerald Mossinghoff, Assistant Secretary & Commissioner of Patents & Trademarks, indi-
cating that contemporary case law requiring that a joint inventor contribute to all claims in
a patent was difficult and sometimes impossible to comply with, and recommending pas-
sage of the proposed 1984 patent law amendments to change the case law).
SAB Industri AB v. Bendix Corp., 199 U.S.P.Q. (SNA) 95, 104 (E.D. Va. 1978); JlIon-
santo, 269 F. Supp. at 824; SECTION-By-SEcrioN ANALYSIS, 130 CONG. REC. 28,071, reprinted
in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5833-34.
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sank), a leading case on joint inveniorship from 1967. 78 In that case,
the U.S. District. Court for the District of Columbia confronted the
question of whether defendants Kamp and Jahn were proper joint
inventors for a patent on a polyethylene lined plastic bottle. 79 Kamp
owned and actively managed the business and employed Jahn as a
chemist. 80
 The two men each had their own laboratory and conducted
experimental work. 8 ' According to their collective recollection, Jahn
conducted the majority of the experimental work, but Kamp con-
ducted some experiments as wel1. 82
 More often, Jahn would report
some of his findings to Kamp, and Kamp frequently made suggestions
to him.83
 In finding the two proper joint inventors, the court articu-
lated a now famous standard for joint inventorship:
Each needs to perform but a part of the task if an invention
emerges front all of the steps taken together. It is not neces-
sary that the entire inventive concept should occur to each
of the joint inventors, or that the two should physically work
together. One may take a step at one time, the other an ap-
proach at different. times. One may do more of the experi-
mental work while the other makes suggestions from time to
time. The fact that each of the inventors plays a different
role and that, the contribution of one may not be as great as
that of another, does not detract from the fact that the in-
vention is joint, if each makes some original contribution,
though partial, to the final solution of the problem. 84
The Monsanto court's description of what was not required to become
a joint inventor was essentially adopted in the 1984 amendments
without substantive modification.85
 Note the inherently vague nature
of this approach—by describing only that which does not disqualify
one from joint inventorship, the criteria provide little guidance as to
78
 Monsanto, 269 F. Stipp. at 824; SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS, 130 CONC. REC.
28,071, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5833-34.
7s
	 269 F. Stipp. at 824. The defendant's patent was challenged as invalid for
failure to name the proper inventors.
o' Id. at 825.
81 Id.
88 Id.
85 Id.
84
 Monsanto, 269 F. Supp. at 824.
85 See Patent Law Amendments Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-662, § 104(a), 98 Stat. 3383,
3384 (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 116 (2000)); Monsanto. 269 F. Stipp. at 824; SECTION-BY-
SECTION ANALYSIS, 130 CONG. REC. 28,071, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5833-34.
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what does qualify one for joint inventorship." The Monsanto court did
provide some positive requirements for finding joint inventorship,
including that joint inventors each collaborate and contribute to the
inventive thought and final result. 87 These positive criteria, for un-
stated reasons, were not adopted. 88 Congress seems to have been re-
luctant to promulgate specific standards for joint inventorship lest a
court omit a bona fide inventor from a patent for failure to meet rigid
statutory requirements." In adopting Monsan to, Congress also implic-
itly rejected the more narrow contemporary rule of the 1981 case
General Motors Coq). v. Toyota Motor Cotp., in which the U.S. Cowl of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit had formulated a test equating "working
under the aegis of one employer" to joint inventorship." In that case,
General Motors sued Toyota for infringement of a catalytic converter
patent.91 General Motors' engineers developed the catalytic converter
working sporadically over a period of years.92 Toyota argued that Gen-
eral Motors' patent was invalid because the converter was developed
in three stages, different engineers working on each stage, and that.
the prior stages constituted disabling prior art to the final patent. 93
86 See 35 U.S.C. § 116; Patent Law Amendments Act of 1984 § 104(a); Monsanto, 269 F.
Stipp. at 824.
87 See Patent Law Amendments Act of 1984 § 104(a); Monsanto, 269 F. Supp. at 824.
ea Sec SEurtoN-BY-SEcnorr ANALYSIS, supra note 71, at 28,071, reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5833-34.
99 q id.
99 See Gen. Motors Corp. v. Toyota Motor Co., 667 F.2d 504, 506-07 (6th Cir. 1981)
[hereinafter Gen. Motors II]; SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS, supra note 71, at 28,071, re-
printed in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5833-34; see also Fasse, supra note 1, at 186-87 (discussing
the significance of Congressional rejection of Gen. Motors II).
91 Gen. Akton II, 667 F.2d at 505.
82 Id. at 506; Gen. Motors /, 467 F. Stipp. at 1150-51.
93 Gen. Motors II, 667 F.2d at 506. The patentability of an invention is evaluated in the
context of prior art, which is the body of existing knowledge at the time of the invention.
Of course, an invention is not patentable if, in light of the prior art, it is "obvious" to one
skilled in the art. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000). Under the law at the time, an invention was un-
patentable if a patentee's prior invention rendered the present invention obvious. In re
Clemens, 622 F.2d 1029, 1038 (C.C.P.A. 1980); In re Bass, 474 F.2d 1276, 1285-86, 1288
(C.C.P.A. 1973). Recognizing that team research often produces a number of related in-
ventions, team members contributing varying amounts to each, Congress desired to elimi-
nate from consideration prior art that was simply a result of prior work either by the inven-
tor or the research team. Congress amended 35 U.S.C. § 103 to disqualify these kinds of
prior art (those failing under 35 U.S.C. § 102(0 and (g)) from consideration in determin-
ing patentability. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103(c); Patent Law Amendments Act of 1984, Pub.
L. 98-662, § 103, 98 Stat. 3383, 3384 (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 116 (2000)); SEcrioN-Br-
SECTION ANALYSIS, 130 Conic. Rec. 28,071, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5833-31. This
was yet another 1984 amendment Congress made to encourage team research. See also
Fasse, supra note 1, at 167-70 (providing further discussion of these amendments).
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The court rejected this argument, stating that the numerous inventors
had all worked "under the aegis of a common employer towards a
common goal," and thus were considered part of the inventive proc-
ess.94
 Under the circumstances, the Sixth Circuit thought it unrealistic
to require that joint inventors work side by side and that each step he
taken by all the company's collaborators. 95
 The court viewed the de-
velopment of the catalytic converter as one long process and found
every engineer who participated was eligible to be a joint inventor. 99
Congressional rejection of the rationale of this case, not even includ-
ing it as a non-requisite positive criterion, again indicates a reluctance
to provide more specific guidelines to the court for determining joint
inventorship—rather, Congress seemed content, to emphasize that the
minimum threshold for inventorship must accommodate team re-
search.97
Congress's second adoption from contemporary case law was an
explicit endorsement of the rationale of SAB Industri AB and its "non-
all-claims" rule. 98 Prior to 1984, some courts required that a pur-
ported joint inventor contribute to the subject matter of all the claims
in the paten t. 99
 In 1978, in SAB Indusni AB, the U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of Virginia stated in dicta that neither the statute
nor U.S. Patent. and Trademark Office (USPTO) regulations required
a joint inventor to contribute to every claim in a patent. 09 Rather,
contribution to just one claim was enough, 10
 Congress saw the "all-
claims" rule as a considerable obstacle to team research, because
many team members made small but significant contributions that,
91 Gen. Motors II, 667 F.2d at 507.
9' Id.
96
 See id,
97 See SECTION-IIV-SECTION ANALYSIS, 130 CoNG. Rm. 28,071, reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5834.
ga SAB Industri AB, 199 U.S.P.Q. at 95, 104; SECTION-HY-SECTION ANALYSIS, 130 CON(:.
REc. 28,071, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5833-34.
rY4 Sec Hearings, supra note 76, at 6, 28-29, 157-58 (testimony of Gerald Mossinghoff,
Assistant Secretary & Commissioner of Patents & Trademarks and statement of Professor
Herbert F. Schwarz from the University of Pennsylvania); Fasse, supra note 1, at 11.145 (cit-
ing Stewart v. Telik, 32 F. 665 (C.C.S.D. III. 1887); Warden v. Fisher, 11 F. 505 (C.C.E.D.
Mich. 1882); Rival Mfg. Co. v. Dazey Prods. Co.. 358 F. Stipp. 91, 101 (W.D. Mo. 1973) (in
favor of the rule requiring contribution to all claims); In re Sarett, 327 F.2d 1005 (C.C.P.A.
1964); and contrasting Vekamaf Holland B.V. v. Pipe Benders, Inc., 211 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
955, 966 (D, Minn. 1981); SAB Industri AB, 199 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 95 (against the "all-
claims" rule)) .
too See SAB hidirstri Ali, 199 U.S.P.Q. at 104.
101 See id.; SECT/oN-IIY-SECTION ANALYSIS, 130 CONC., REC. 28,071, reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5833-34.
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through the imprecise artifice of claim drafting, were not captured in
every claim.'" The all-claims rule hindered team research by discour-
aging small contributions to a project.'" With the abandonment of
the all-claims rule, Congress clearly lowered the bar for joint inventor-
ship. 10" Though adopting a non-all-claims rule, Congress did empha-
size its conceptual limit—if a particular feature of an invention is ac-
tually a separate invention, then the joint inventors should not
include it in the claims of one patent, or attempt to patent it as a joint
invention.'" Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 121, a patent application may
only contain one invention)" If a patent application discloses two
inventions, it is subject to a restriction requirement, whereby the
original patent application is "restricted" to one of the inventions. 107
The remaining invention becomes the subject of a "divisional" appli-
cation and patentability is pursued separately.'" Thus applicants place
the inventions in two separate patents, the inventors of each separate
invention listed only on the patent to which they contributed.'" Each
patent should truly embody not two but one single invention—the
product of joint inventors. 11 °
2. 35 U.S.C. § 256—Correction of Named Inventor
If an issued patent is found to name an incorrect person (mis-
joinder) or omit an inventor (nonjoinder), 35 U.S.C. § 256 permits
either the Commissioner of the USPTO or the federal courts to cor-
rect the error)" The correction could be the addition of an inventor,
the deletion of an individual, or the complete substitution of one in-
ventor for another. 112 The statutory language indicates this action may
102 See SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS, 130 CONG. REC. 28,071, reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5833-34; 130 CONG. REC. E34,803 (1983) (remarks of Rep. liastenmeier
during drafting of the bill).
101 See SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS, 130 CONG, REC. 28,071, mprintcd in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5833-34.
104 See id.
165 See id.
1 °6 35 U.S.C. § 121 (2000).
107 Sec id. A restriction requirement occurs when a Patent Examiner determines that a
patent application actually describes two inventions. The inventor restricts the application
to only one of the invention and files a separate application for the remaining invention.
MANUAL, supra note 38, §§ 802-803.
108 See 35 U.S.0 § 121; MANUAL, supra note 38, §§ 802-803.
1" See 35 U.S.C. § 121.
110 See id.
"t Sec id. § 256.
112 Stark v. Advanced Magnetics, Inc., 119 F.3d 1551, 1555-56 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
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be taken "[w]henever through error a person is named in an issued
patent as the inventor, or through error an inventor is not named in
an issued patent and such error arose without any deceptive intention
on his part."'" Significantly, courts interpret the word "error" to con-
note any error, including deliberate acts or honest mistakes.'" There-
fore, even purposeful omissions (presumably by the named inven-
tors), if the omitted inventor does not know about it, still fall tinder
the definition of an "error: 115
 The unnamed inventor, though, must
have acted "without any deceptive intention." 16 If it can be corrected
under § 256, the patent is not invalid for erroneously naming the im-
proper inventors when it was isstted. 117 The statute is quite liberal in
application—a patent can usually be corrected. 118
 If the validity of a
patent is challenged in court (by the defendant in an infringement
suit who produces an alleged joint inventor and shows by clear and
convincing evidence that the joint inventor should be named on the
patent), the patentee (the plaintiff) has the burden of proving by
clear and convincing evidence that the unnamed joint inventor acted
without deceptive intent, and that, therefore, the patent can be cor-
rected. 119
 But in this regard, good faith, or the absence of deceptive
intent, on the part of the unnamed inventor is presumed. 120
 The pat-
entee must make a motion to correct the patent and the court then
orders correction pursuant to § 256. 121
 The correction is not auto-
matic. 122
 The only prerequisites to a § 256 action are notice and an
opportunity to be heard. 123
 There is no requirement of consent. on
the part. of the named inventors, or of diligence on the part of the
unnamed inventor seeking correction) 24
115 35 U.S.C. § 256.
114 See Stark, 119 F.3d at 1554-55.
115 See id.
116 See id. at 1555.
117 35 U.S.C. § 256.
118
119 See Pannu, 155 F.3d at 1350-51.
170
 See id. at 1351 n.4. The Federal Circuit is not entirely clear on exactly how the pre-
sumption of good faith comports with the patentee's burden of proof—it seems, at a
minimum, the patentee must make a perfunctory assertion of good faith, then in the ab-
sence of contradicting evidence, ask for correction of the patent tinder § 256. See Barney &
Carlson, supra note 17, at 29.
1 = 1 Forum, 155 F.3d at 1350-51.
122 Id. at 1350.
125 Stalk, 119 F.3d at 1553.
124 Id. at 1553-54; Stark v. Advanced Magnetics, Inc., 29 F.3d 1570, 1575 (Fed. Cir.
1994).
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Courts presume the named inventors on a patent are correct and
the burden of showing misjoinder or nonjoinder is a heavy one, which
must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. 125 This rule follows
from the understanding that the temptation is too great for even
honest witnesses to reconstruct events and their states of mind in a
way favorable to themselves, especially when those events occurred
years beforehand. 1" Therefore, in addition to the alleged inventor's
testimony, corroborating evidence is required. 127 Corroborating evi-
dence can take the form of documents, contemporaneous disclosures
of information, or testimony of persons other than the alleged joint
inventor.'" The evidence may be direct or circumstantial and is evalu-
ated in context by the trial court, making credibility determinations
necessary to determine if, overall, the claim of joint inventorship is
credible.' As a result of this comprehensive examination, corrobora-
tion is not required for every single factual issue that the parties con-
test.'" A case illustrative of a borderline level of corroboration is Vir-
ginia Electronic & Lighting Corp. v. National Service Industries, decided in
2000. 131 In Virginia Electronic, the Federal Circuit held that prototypes
sent by the alleged inventor (the plaintiff) and oral testimony of a
third party were sufficient to corroborate a § 256 claim of joint inven-
torship for a light-emitting-diode (LED) lamp.'" Under the terms of a
confidentiality agreement, the alleged inventor sent prototype lamps
to the defendant, who employed the named inventor. 133 A few months
later, the defendant applied for a patent on certain features for LED
lamps. 134 The alleged inventor's evidence consisted of his own testi-
mony, the prototype lamps sent to the defendant, and the testimony
of a third party who supplied lamps to the alleged inventor (but who,
distressingly; then testified that the third party had actually made the
invention). 135 The court stated that the sufficiency of the evidence was
a "very close question," but held that, crediting all inferences in favor
123 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2000); Adorned, 253 F.3d at 1379; Ethicon, 135 F.3d at 1460; Hess,
106 F.3c1 at 980.
123 See Hess, 106 F.3d at 980.
127
 Aeromed, 253 F.3d al 1379; Ethicon, 135 F.3d at 1461; Hess, 106 F.3d at 980.
1213 Ethicon, 135 F.3d at 1461.
129 Id. at 1464.
159 Id.
131 See generally Va. Elec. & Lighting Corp. v. Nat'l Ser•. Indus., 230 F.3d 1377, 2000 WL
12729 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
132 Id, at *5_6.
133 Id. at *1-2.
134
 Id. at *2.
133
 Id. at *5.
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of the plaintiff, the evidence was sufficient to reverse the district
court's summary judgment decision for the defendant. 13° The court
noted that it was not. clear whether the lamps actually contained the
features at issue, but this uncertainty and the third party claiming to
be the inventor both created genuine issues of material fact, 137
 The
court also highlighted relevant circumstantial evidence: (1) the de-
fendant approaching the plaintiff to be a vendor for the lamps, (2)
the plaintiff's experience in the lighting industry, (3) the informal
business relationship between the two, (4) the absence of compensa-
tion to the plaintiff for the work on the lamps, and (5) the similarities
between the plaintiff's drawings and the patent figures."8
3. 35 U.S.C. § 262—Patent Ownership
The language of 35 U.S.C. § 262 grants broad powers to each
joint owner of a patent:
In the absence of any agreement to the contrary, each of the
joint owners of a patent may make, use, offer to sell, or sell
the patented invention within the United States, or import
the patented invention into the United States, without the
consent of and without accounting to the other owners. 139
The law of joint inventorship, as discussed above in Part II.A.1., pro-
vides a low and uncertain threshold for becoming a joint inventor."°
Nevertheless, as is clear from the plain text of § 262, the law of joint
ownership is not graduated: joint inventors receive a complete bundle
of ownership rights regardless of the quality or quantity of their con-
tribution to the inventive subject matter."' Joint owners each own an
undivided share in the whole patent) ." Joint owners may unilaterally
license or assign their interest in the patent without accounting to
other owners." 3
 One rationale for this view is that if joint owners were
required to account to each other, there would exist a disincentive to
tsa l'a. Elec., 2000 WL 12729. at *5.
1 " Id. at *5-6.
"8 Id. at *7.
Is' 35 U.S.C. § 262 (2000).
"° See &Won, 135 F.3d at 1469-71.
HI Sec 35 U.S.C. § 262.
Ethicon, 135 F.3d at 1465.
1x8 35 U.S.C. § 262. For a comparison of joint ownership law in the United States with
the law in other countries, and an economic evaluation of U.S. law (particularly provisions
for accounting to other joint tenants), see generally Merges & Locke, supra note 10.
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utilize the patent because part of the profits would be siphoned off to
other joint owners who had clone no work." 4 In effect, the rule would
create "free-riders" who do not seek to advance or commercialize the
technological development." 5 On the other hand, it has been argued
that because a joint inventor can freely (or indiscriminately) license
the entire patent, the current rule does create a disincentive to col-
laborate."6 Another principle of joint ownership is that an action for
infringement must join all joint owners of a patent as plaintiffs. 147 This
rule protects the rights of all patent joint owners (because, for in-
stance, a court could invalidate the patent), prevents infringers from
multiple lawsuits, and protects licensees from harassing lawsuits by
other joint owners."8 Because all joint owners of a patent are neces-
sary parties to a suit for patent infringement and may not be involun-
tarily joined," 9 a joint owner can prevent other joint owners from su-
ing an infringer. 150 Patent joint owners are essentially "at the mercy"
of one another.'"
B. The Ethicon Case
In 1998, in the seminal case Ethicon, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Cmp., the
Federal Circuit issued a troubling split decision that stirred debate
over the efficacy of current joint inventorship and joint owner law.'"
144 Sec Merges & Locke, supra note 10, at 593-94 (discussing the view espoused in 2
WiLtAmt C. ROBINSON, ROBINSON ON PATENTS § 796 (1890)).
145 See id. at 594.
146 See id. at 594-95.
"2 See Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U.S. 252, 255 (1891); Moore v. Marsh, 74 U.S. (7
Wall.) 515, 520-21 (1868).
148 Willingliain v. Lawton, 555 F.2d 1340, 1344 (6th Cir. 1977).
149
 See Ethicon, 135 F.3d at 1468; Schering Corp. v. Roussel-UCLAF SA, 104 F.3d 341,
345 (Fed. Cir. 1997). A joint owner could either refuse to join suit or grant the infringing
party a license (both of which happened M Ethicon), but cannot absolve a party of liability
for past infringement and past damages. Sec &tiering, 104 F.3d at 345. Such an action re-
quires a release, which cannot be granted by a single joint owner alone. See id. A patent
joint owner can be involuntarily joined only pursuant to a prior existing contract whereby
the patent joint ownership has waived its right to refuse to join suit. Sec id. Also, if a patent
owner grants an exclusive license, that owner stands in a relationship of trust to the licen-
see and must allow hint to sue in his name. See Ethical, 135 F.3d at 1468 n.9 (citing Indep.
Wireless Tele. Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 169 U.S. 459, 469 (1926), and Willingham, 555
F.2d at 1344-45).
I" See Ethicon, 135 F.3d at 1468; Barney & Carlson, supra note 17, at 33; Carlson &
Barney, supra note 12, at 260.
151
 Ethicon, 135 F.3d at 1468 (quoting Willingham, 555 F.2d at 1344).
152 See id. The debate continues in popular legal media, see supra note 1 and accompa-
nying text, and in scholarly journals, see infra notes 224-264 and accompanying text.
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The patent concerned a trocar, a surgical tool." The tool is used to
make incisions in the wall of a body cavity that allow the insertion of
medical instruments.'" One problem with these devices was that. the
sudden loss of resistance when a surgeon completed an incision could
cause the blade of the trocar to plunge forward into internal or-
gans. 155
 In the late 1970s, Dr. InBae Yoon began to conceive of an im-
proved trocar that. would lessen the risk of organ damage by retract-
ing the blade into a protective sheath as it entered a body cavity and
providing a signal to the surgeon when the incision was nearly com-
plete. 15° In 1980, Dr. Yoon met an electronics technician, Young Chae
Choi, who had worked on the research and development of other
technical devices and agreed to help him on the trocar project.. 157 Af-
ter working together for eighteen months, the collaboration between
the two ended when Choi decided the work was unlikely to produce
any viable product and asked to leave. 158
 Shortly thereafter, however,
Yoon filed for a patent on the trocar, naming himself the sole inventor
of all fifty-five claims. 159
 When the patent issued, Yoon granted an ex-
clusive license to Ethicon. 160
 In 1989, Ethicon sued U.S. Surgical for
infringement of the Yoon patent.. 161
In its defense, U.S. Surgical alleged that under § 256, Dr. Yoon's
technical assistant Choi should be named a joint. inventor on the
Ethicon patent and stated that they had purchased a license from Mr.
Choi. 162
 To corroborate his testimony, Choi provided his notebook
sketches of some of the trocar features. 163
 Notwithstanding a pointed
dissent by Judge Newman, the majority held that Choi had contrib-
uted to two of the fifty-five claims in the patent.'" The court. found
that, on both claims, Choi had at least contributed to one alternate
structure of a means-plus-function statement. 165
 For example, the
court pointed to some of Choi's drawings of electrical networks and
153 Ethican, 135 F.3d at 1459.
"4 Id.
155 Id.
156 Id.
157 Id.
158 Ethicon, 135 F.3d at 1359.
159 Id .
160 id.
161
 Id. Exclusive licensees have the power to sue for patent infringement, though the
patent is not their property. Sec supra note 149.
162
 Ethicon, 135 F.3d at 1459.
163 Id, at 1462.
164 Id. at 1461-64,1469-71.
/ 65
 See id. at 1462-64. For a discussion of means-plus-function claims see supra note 40.
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indicated that these were alternate embodiments of the feature
claimed as "[means for] creating a sensible signal." 156 The court
pointed to other drawings in Choi's notebook resembling certain fea-
tures of the patented trocar. 167 The court also cited a number of cir-
cumstantial factors in finding Choi's claim of joint inventorship cor-
roborated. 165 For instance, the court highlighted (1) Yoon's need for
a person with electronics expertise, (2) Choi's electronics expertise,
(3) Yoon's proposal that the two work together, (4) their informal
business relationship, (5) the length of time they worked together, (6)
the absence of pay to Choi, (7) the similarity between the patent
figures and the notebook drawings, and (8) Choi's letter saying lie
could no longer be a "member" of Yoon's business. 169 The court then
held that the contributor of any disclosed means of a means-plus-
function claim element is a joint inventor as to that claim, unless one
asserting sole inventorship can show that the contribution of that
means was simply a reduction to practice of the sole inventor's
broader concept.'" Therefore, and most importantly, the court held
that by contributing to at least one claim in the patent, Choi became a
joint inventor and joint owner of the entire patent."' Because Choi
was a joint owner of the patent, he became a necessary plaintiff in the
suit against U.S. Surgical," 2 As Choi would not join the suit, it was
dismissed. 173
Judge Newman's dissent focused on the fundamental inequity of
awarding Choi patent rights in all fifty-five claims of the patent when
he had at most contributed to two claims.'" Judge Newman pointed
out that under pre-1984 law, Choi would not have been considered a
joint inventor because he had not contributed to all the claims in the
patent."5 She interpreted § 116 as merely permitting the naming of
an additional person as a joint inventor on a patent." 6 Equal owner-
ship rights, she explained, did not automatically flow from this nam-
ing because inventorship and ownership of patent rights are concep-
166 Ethicon, 135 F.3d at 1461-62.
167 Id.
168 Id. at 1464.
169 Id.
17° Id. at 1463-64.
171 Ethicon, 135 F.3d at 1466.
172 Id. at 1467-68.
' 73 Id. at 1468.
174 See id. at 1468-71.
175 Id. at 1469.
116 See Ethicon, 135 F.3d at 1469.
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tually distinct. 177
 Ownership rights in a patent, she contended, were
based on the notion that both inventors had shared equally in the in-
vention. 178
 A joint invention, under pre-1984 law, was the simultane-
ous production of the genius and labor of both parties. 179 Thus, the
tenancy-in-common model for patent ownership, each tenant owning
an undivided share of the whole, was appropriate. 180
 But because the
law of joint inveutorship had changed, the law of joint ownership
should have been reevaluated by the majority. 181
 According to Judge
Newman, by applying pre-1984 ownership concepts to the post-1984
amended law of joint inventorship, the majority had inequitably ap-
portioned patent rights. 182
 Nevertheless, Judge Newman did not pur-
port to provide a complete answer; she only proposed that perhaps a
patent could be partitioned, such that each inventor owned the claims
to which they contributed rather than the entire patent.. 183
 In fact, she
noted with some frustration that there was little scholarly debate on
the subject. 184
The Ethicon ruling exposed the previously dormant rift between
joint. inveutorship and joint ownership and highlighted the seeming
inequities that could result from 11. 185 The case also created a some-
what treacherous state of law to guide group researchers in determin-
ing who should be involved in a research and development project, as
even small contributors now were potentially joint inventors. 180 Judge
Newman's dissent also generated some discussion on amending the
law of joint ownership of patents. 187
C. The Effect of Current Joint hwentorship Rules on. Collaborative Research
Since the 1984 amendments, the standards for joint inventorship
have frequently been described as muddy—in that respect, little has
177 See id. at 1469-70,
178 See id. at 1469.
179 Id.
00 See id. at 1470.
181 See Ethieon, 135 F.3d at 1471
182 Sec id. at 1471.
10 Cf. id. at 1471 11.1.
184 See id. at 1971.
185
 See id. at 1468-71.
188 See Ethican, 135 F.3d at 1468-71.
187
 This discussion occurred in both the legal media and scholarly journals. See supra
note 1 and accompanying text; see generally Carlson & Barney, supra note 12; Konectly, supra
note 16.
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changed recently. 188 But the Ethicon case raised the stakes in the joint
inventorship game and was met with a round of trepidation, a smat-
tering of booing, and a dose of "how did we end up here?" hand-
wringing. 189 Current joint inventorship rules affect conduct both in
and out of the courtroom. 1"
In the courtroom, a defendant in an infringement suit can often
assert a defense based on joint inventorship principles. 191 A defendant
can find an unnamed joint inventor to license the patent to the de-
fendant (or otherwise persuade the unnamed party to refrain from
voluntarily joining the suit), as in Ethicon. 192 A defendant. can assert
that a patent is invalid under § 256 for failure to name the proper in-
ventors and place a burden on the patentee to show the named inven-
tors are correct. 1" There are three steps in this process. First, the
party asserting nonjoinder (the defendant) must show by clear and
convincing evidence that the omitted inventor contributed to the pat-
ent. 194 Then, the burden of proving that the patent can be corrected
falls on the plaintiff (a burden that entails proving that the unnamed
inventor acted without deceptive intent). 1 " Finally, the patentee must
ask the court to correct the patent pursuant to the statute. 196 The ef-
fectiveness of this strategy is somewhat unclear, in part because the
Federal Circuit seems to place the burden of proof on the plaintiff,
but then presumes good faith on the part of the unnamed inventor. 197
It is at least a delay or nuisance tactic (particularly if a defendant can
188 See Mueller Brass Co. v. Reading Indus., 352 F. Stipp. 1357,1372 (E.g. Pa. 1972);
Fasse, supra note 1, at 153.
188 See Carlson & Barney, supra note 12, at 266; Konecny, supra note 16, at 142-44, 176;
Clark & Hayes, supra note 1, at 58; Lauson & Brunda, supra note 1, at C12; Sheldon & Mak,
supra note 1, at 7.
' 99 See infra notes 191-221 and accompanying text.
181
 See Ethicon, 135 F.3d at 1458-59; Barney & Carlson, supra note 17, at 24,31-33 (dis-
cussing the strategies behind three affirmative defenses to patent infringement, the recent
Federal Circuit cases that support them, and recommending legislative change to 35
U.S.C. § 256 in light of liberalized joint inventorship rules).
192 See Ethicon, 135 F.3d at 1459; Barney & Carlson, supra note 17, at 31-33.
188 35 U.S.C. § 256 (2000); sec Barney & Carlson, supra note 17, at 29, 33; scc also supra
notes 119-121 and accompanying text.
194 See Palma, 155 F.3d at 1350; Barney & Carlson, supra note 17, at 24; sec also supra
notes 119-120 and accompanying text.
' 93 Sec Pannu, 155 F.3d at 1350; Barney & Carlson, supra note l7, at 24; see also supra
notes 119-120 and accompanying text,
188 See Pannu, 155 F.3d at 1350-51; Barney, & Carlson supra note 17, at 24; see also supra
note 121-122 and accompanying text.
197 Sec Barney & Carlson, supra note 17, at 29; see also supra note 120 and accompanying
text.
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find more than one potential unnamed inventor, given the low hurdle
for joint inventorship), but if there is uncontroverted evidence of de-
ceptive intent, such a move could be fatal to the patent. 198 In another
strategy, a defendant can assert that pursuant to § 112 1 the patent
did not disclose the best mode known to an inventive entity. 199
Though these technical defenses are generally disfavored by courts,
they are nevertheless viable strategies which affect and sometimes de-
termine the outcome of cases. 200
 Of course, aside from these defenses
there is the more straightforward inequity that a relatively minor con-
tributor (even one who only made a sales visit to the inventor), 201 on
seeing the commercial success of a patented invention, may sue pur-
suant to § 256 to be named a joint inventor. That contributor could
gain unrestricted ownership of the patent---a reward sufficient to en-
tice many contributors, and their contingent-fee counsel, to initiate
legal action.
Outside the courtroom, this law affects the conduct of both re-
searchers and patent counsel in a few ways. 202
 These extra-judicial ef-
fects are particularly disturbing, considering that the legislative intent
of the 1984 patent amendments involved encouraging open re-
searc11.203
First, the job of patent counsel is complicated by joint inventor-
ship rules, which increase the interplay between patent counsel and
researchers. N time rous commentators note the dangerous implica-
tions of unnamed joint inventors in an effort to increase awareness of
potential probletns. 204 A frequent recommendation is to involve at-
198 Sec Barney & Carlson. supra note 17, at 24; sec also supra notes 119-122 and accom-
panying text.
199 See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000); Barney & Carlson, supra note 17, at 32-33. Under 35
U.S.C. § 112 1, a patent "shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of
carrying out his invention." If a defendant can prove the unnamed inventor knew of a best
mode of carrying out the invention which was not included in the patent specification
(even if that inventor is later added to the patent), then the patent might be invalidated
under § 112. The Federal Circuit has indicated a willingness to entertain such an argu-
ment. See Barney & Carlson, supra note 17, at 32-33; see also Pall ?M. 155 F.3d at 1351 n.5
(stating that if a patent is corrected, a defendant may nevertheless assert the theory that
the proper inventive entity failed to disclose its best mode).
2°
 See generally Citisum, supra noie I, § 2.0314), at 2-54.
261 See generally Patina, 135 F.3d at 1344.
" Sec Clark & Hayes, supra note 1, at S8; Lauson & Brunda, supra note 1, at C12;
Sheldon & Mak, supra note 1, at 7.
203 See SECTION-6Y-SEC'FION ANALYSIS, 130 Conn:. 11..tx.. 28,071, reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5833-34; Sung, supra note 15, at 435-30.
204 Sec TIlE LAW AND STRATEGY OF BIOTECHNOLOGY PATENTS 138 (Kenneth D. Sibley
ed., 1994) [hereinafter 1..Aw AND STRATEGY] (observing that whenever collaborative team
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torneys at an early stage in the research process and to evaluate the
role of each collaborator on a team, as well as the potential rights ac-
cruing to that person.205 In this way, joint inventorship rules place
significant restrictions on the ability of researchers to collaborate
freely and necessitate attorney involvement in the research process. 206
Second, the recognition that the subject matter in a patent can
greatly affect ownership rights complicates the prosecution of pat-
ents."7 Often, patent counsel may be able to control how many inven-
tions are contained in each patent, notwithstanding the rule in § 121
that each patent contain only a single invention. 2" By including what
is arguably more than one invention in a single patent, joint inventors
may gain ownership rights to subject matter to which they did not
contribute according to the Ethiccu reasoning.209 For this reason, the
right to control the patent prosecution resulting from collaborative
research enterprises becomes crucial. 21 °
efforts produce an invention, the issue of inventorship is a "constant source of confusion"
and lutist be carefully resolved); ARTHuR H. SEmEt. El' AL., WHAT THE GENERAL PRAcTi-
TIONER SHOULD KNOW ABOUT PATENT LAW AND PRACTICE 6 (5th ed. 1993) (recommend-
ing that patent counsel be involved when inventions are likely to result from large meet-
ings, consultant w'or'k, and large-scale research programs); Regalado, supra note 15, at B4
(noting that in the setting of academic research, researchers conducting patentable work
cannot interact without legal negotiations); see also Clark & Hayes, supra note 1, at S8; Lau-
son & Brunda, supra note 1, at C12; Sheldon & Mak, supra note 1, at 7.
2°5 See LAW AND STRATEGY, supra note 204, at 138; SEIDEL, supra note 204, at 6; Rega-
lado, supra note 15, at B4.
2°6 See LAW AND STRATEGY, supra note 204, at 138; SEIDEL, supra note 204, at 6; Rega-
lado, supra note 15, at B4.
207 Eric K. Steffe & Grant E. Reed, Patent Prosecution and Joint Ownership of United States
Patents, INTELL. PROP. TODAY, Slay 2000, at 22 (describing numerous methods by which a
patent prosecutor could control the number of inventions in a patent and thereby control
ownership of those inventions, and recommending that parties to collaborative research
agreements negotiate who has control to prosecute patentable work resulting from it).
208 See id. The authors explain that, based on current USPTO examination practices,
more than one distinct invention may be examined in the same patent application. This
result can be achieved via the following strategies: (1) a showing that the examination of
the inventions in one patent does not create an undue burden on the examiner; (2) elect-
ing to prosecute a product claim, pursuant to a restriction requirement, then "re-joining"
the process claim depending on that product claim; (3) requesting examination of multi-
ple distinct "species inventions" which fall under a genus claim that may not be patentable;
(4) examination of polynucleotide sequences, up to about ten of which can be examined
per application; or (5) filing au application tinder the Patent Cooperation Treaty (a com-
mon international application) and proving that there is a "common technical relation-
ship" between the claims and that when a patent is examined in the U.S. the claims will be
examined together, even if a restriction would have been required in an original U.S, ap-
plication. See id. at 22 nn.32 & 34.
200 See Ethicon, 135 F.3d at 1471; Steffe & Reed, supra note 207, at 22.
210 See Steffe & Reed, supra note 207, at 22.
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Third, the law affects relations between researchers, 2 " A recent
exploration of this problem is Lawrence Sung's Collegiality and Collabo-
ration in the Age of Exclusivity, which explores the impact of the new
minimum criteria of joint inventorship on the medical and pharma-
ceutical arts. 212
 At its heart, Sung says, the patent system balances the
public good of disclosing inventive ideas, so that others may build
upon them, with the dangers of granting a limited monopoly right.213
Science is optimally a collaborative effort. 214 This notion rests on the
additive concept of background experience, cognitive synergy, and
the social aspects of collaboration.215
 Sung posits that scientists are
typically organized in communities of inventive scholars, and that the
nature of collegial interaction and collaboration within these com-
munities are influenced by patent laws. 216 This influence derives from
the pecuniary and honorary benefits to being named as an inventor
on a patent, 2"
Sung argues that the pronouncements of the Federal Circuit. in
recent cases concerning joint inventorship have led to anxiety in the
exchange of information between researchers.218 One can point to
amended § 116  and the court's interpretation of that provision as the
primary factors.20
 Current doctrine could result in restrictions on
extramural collaboration among scientists. 220
 As Sung puts it, Ethicon
escalatIes1 the potential harm from unseen joint inventorship sce-
narios" and thereby fosters "an environment of caution and mis-
trust."221
Other commentators such as Rochelle Dreyfuss have noted (lie
increased value of collaboration in today's research emironment. 222
She argues that the current prevalence and value of collaborative
work product stems from a number of factors: intense specialization
of many scientists, necessitating collaboration; the globalization of the
marketplace; new avenues, particularly the Internet, that ease col-
Sting, supra note 15, at 435-36.
212 sec
 id, at 411, 416.
215 Id. at 413.
214 Id. at 416-19.
215 Id. at 419.
216 Sung, supra note 15, at 420.
217 Ste id. at 421.
218
 Sec id, at 435.
219 See id. at 936.
2" Sec id. at 435-36.938.
221 sung , supra note 15, at 436.
212 See Dreyfuss, supra note 14, at 1161-67.
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laboration; the rise in use of transient expert collaborators such as
consultants; the expansion of intellectual property rights; and the
need to encourage highly accomplished experts to collaborate . 223
D. Heretofore Proposed Solutions
Most proposals for change have focused on procedural solutions
or on the law of joint ownership under § 262, which Congress left un-
changed in 1984. 224 The suggestions take various forms, but their
general thrust is to amend the joint ownership rules either judicially
or legislatively through an amendment to § 262. 225 Such an amend-
ment would essentially update the law of joint ownership to comport
with the post-1984 law of joint inventorship. 226 A brief discussion of
these approaches illustrates the feasibility of amending joint owner-
ship law and the variety of means to do so, and simultaneously pro-
vides background for understanding where such approaches succeed
and where they fail.
In The Division of Right Among Join! Inventors: Public Policy Concerns
After Ethicon v. U.S. Surgical, Dale Carlson and James Barney offer a
practitioner's perspective and suggest modification to the rule that
patent joint owners must voluntarily join a suit for infringement, the
crux of the problem in Ethicon.227 They examine the standard three
policy reasons for this rule. 228 First, the authors confront the rationale
that each interested party should have an opportunity to protect that
party's substantive rights;229 when any one joint owner attempts to sue
on a patent, the patent rights of all are put at risk because the patent
could be found invalid during the proceeclings. 23° Nevertheless, the
authors point out that if patent owners are at each other's mercy with
225 See id. at 1162-63,1166.
224 Sec 35 U.S.C. § 262 (2000); Carlson & Barney, supra note 12, at 263-66; Tigran Gtt-
ledjian, Notes & Comments, Teaching the Federal Circuit New Tricks: Updating the Law ofJoint
laventorship in Patents, 32 Lov, L.A. L REV. 1273,1301-02 (1999); Konecny, supra note 16,
at 175-76.
225 See 35 U.S.C. § 262; Carlson & Barney, supra note 12, at 263-66; Guledjian, supra
note 224, at 1301-02; Konecny, supra note 16, at 146,176.
226 See 35 U.S.C. § 262; Carlson & Barney, supra note 12, at 263-66; Guledjian, supra
note 224, at 1301-02; Konecny, supra note 16, at 146,176.
227 Sec Carlson & Barney, supra note 12, at 263-64.
228
 Willingham, 555 F.2d at 1344-45; sec Carlson & Barney, supra note 12, at 260-61.
229 Willingham, 555 F'.2(1 at 1344-45; see Carlson & Barney, supra note 12, at 260.
256 Willingham, 555 F.2(1 at 1344-45; see Carlson & Barney, siipra note 12, at 260.
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respect to licensing, there seems to be no justification why they should
not be at each other's mercy in bringing infringement actions."'
Carlson and Barney also confront the rationale that there is a
public interest in not requiring defendants to litigate multiple suits
concerning infringement of a single patent. 232
 They argue that this
goal would also be achieved by allowing involuntary joinclen 233
 In ad-
dition, the authors challenge the notion that there is a public interest
in enabling a patent joint owner to license to third parties without
harassing suits by other joint owners. 234
 Carlson and Barney argue that
this rule is really based on a desire for judicial efficiency; sanctions for
harassing lawsuits already exist under the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure ("FRCP") and any such lawsuit could easily be dismissed be-
fore trial simply by producing a copy of the license from the other
joint owner. 235
 As a result, they propose that non-consenting parties
be involuntarily joined under Rule 19(a) of the FRCP. 236
In another approach, Philip Konecny's Windfall Property Rights for
the Left-Out Co-Inventor Who Gets Let into the Patent explores solutions to
the problem by discussing various ways to divide joint inventors' own-
ership interests."' Konecny bases his solutions on the proposition that
undivided joint ownership depends on substantially equal joint. inven-
torship. 238
 Konecny presents several options for dealing with the dis-
cord between joint inventorship and joint ownership, based on the
idea that. patent ownership can be apportioned rather than left as un-
divided shares in a joint tenancy, an idea espoused by other commen-
tators as wel1. 233
Konecny's first suggestion is to invalidate the patent. if there is a
dispute over inventorship, then allow each inventor to apply for an-
other patent containing only the inventor's specific subject matter. 240
231 See Carlson & Barney, supra note 12, at 260-61.
232 ii riiiinghaM, 555 F.2d at 1344; sec Carlson & Barney, supra note 12, at 261.
233 Sec Carlson & Barney, supra note 12, at 261.
234 Willingham, 555 F.2d at 1344-45; see Carlson & Barney, supra note 12, at 261.
233 See Carlson & Barney, supra note 12, at 261.
238 See id. at 263-64. The authors also advocate clarifying the law with respect to joint
inventorship and property rights after the 1984 amendments, but do not go into detail
about what form the clarifications should take, Sec id, at 266.
232 Konecny, supra note 16, at 141.
238 Id. at 160,
239
 Id. at 164; sec also Dre)fuss, supra note 14, at 1224-25 (proposing a "proportionality
principle" in which each contributor's rights are limited to the claims to which they con-
tributed and each contributor is given an implied right to use the other inventions pro-
tected by the patent).
240 Konecny, supra note 16, at 164-65.
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He notes that this rule would be very harsh, as each party would lose
patent rights and subject matter in the patent would be split. 2"t His
second solution is to sever the claims of the patent, retaining the un-
disputed claims for the named inventor. 242 The remaining claims
would be subject to a reissue proceeding. 243 This solution may not
work, admits Konecny, if the claims of the patent cannot be severed
without destroying the value of the patent—for each severed group of
claims would have to be patentable on its own. 244
Another solution he proposes is to limit the undivided rights of
the newly named joint inventor to the claims to which that joint in-
ventor contributed. 245 Because § 256 only states that courts "may" add
a joint inventor to a patent, Konecny argues courts have the power to
grant rights to each claim rather than to the patent as a whole. 2.16
Then the joint inventors could bargain for the claims, which would
result in a more accurate valuation of each inventor's contribution. 247
Konecny also explores the idea of granting only one inventor (ei-
ther the named or omitted inventor) ownership rights and giving the
other owner damages under 35 U.S.C. § 284. 248 It is unclear how dam-
ages can be estimated (especially future damages) according to this
section, which pertains to infringement, but the suggestion seems to
evoke an accounting process. 249 Konecny does say that, if courts grant.
patent rights to the party most invested in the invention, an efficient
economic result is achieved. 25° According to Konecny, under this
scheme the court would give the party who can best bring the pat-
ented technology to market an unfettered right to the patent. 251 That.
party would only be burdened by a pecuniary liability, which can be
taken out of the profits from the patent. 252
Finally, Konecny suggests that the standard for joint inventorship
simply be raised for patents in which an omitted joint. inventor would
otherwise gain rights to substantially more claims than that to which
241 See id.
242 Id. at 165.
245 Id.
244 See id.
245 Konecny, supra note 16, at 168.
246 See 35 U.S.C. § 256 (2000); Konecny, supra note 16, at 168.
247 See Konecny, supra note 16, at 168.
245 See id. at 168-70.
246 35 U.S.C. § 284; Konecny, supra note 16, at 168-70.
266 Id.
2" Id.
262 Konecny, supra note 16, at 170.
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he contributed.255
 This approach would mean that the party who
made a minor contribution would lose ownership rights. 254 Despite its
harsh consequences, this solution has the advantage of being a quick
judicial fix, without the administrative and foundational shift in pat-
ent prosecution found in his other suggestions. 255
Konecny's main argument is that ownership of patents can be
fashioned in an equitable and efficient way without upsetting the cur-
rent framework for the law of joint inventorship. 256
 His approach is
echoed in Tigran Guledjian's Teaching the Federal Circuit New Tricks:
Updating the Law of faint Inventorship in Patents. 257
 First, Guledjian advo-
cates fractioning the patent into individual claims and calculating an
ownership percentage based on the number of claims to which a joint
inventor contributed . 258
 Tints, by establishing contribution to three
claims in a patent with ten claims, an alleged joint inventor would be
entitled to a thirty-percent ownership share. 259 Guledjian bases this
approach on the common-law right of co-tenants to force partition of
their property. 26° He does not explain how rights attaching to the pat-
ent would be split, or what. significance a split would entail for owner-
ship rights, especially when each joint owner can unilaterally' license a
paten t. 251
Guledjian's second solution is to raise the bar for joint inventor-
ship, again much as Konecny advocates. 262
 He gives the suggestion a
twist, however, by proposing a higher bar for inventorship to deter-
mine only ownership rights, not inventorship. 263
 Thus, an omitted
joint inventor might recover the prestigious accolades that accompany
inventor status, but not the pecuniary reward of ownership. 264
253 See id.
251 id.
255 See id. at 171.
258 See id. at 175-77.
257 Guledjian, supra note 224, at 1298.
258 1d. at 1299.
2" See id.
260 See id.
261 See Id .
262 Gkliedi /at], supra note 224, at 1301.
283 See id.
264 Sec id.
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IL ANALYSIS
A. A mendingjoint Inventorship Rules Is a Better Solution Than Amending
Joint Ownership Rules
Conceptually, the problem of Ethicon, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp. is
often characterized as a discord between post-1984-rules for joint in-
ventorship and pre-1984 rules for joint ownership. 265 This discord,
originating from the 1984 amendments to 35 U.S.C. § 116, has had
effects that are in some instances directly contrary to the explicit
Congressional intent of those amendments. 266 There are two general
solutions to this problem: the law of joint ownership could be up-
dated to reflect relaxed inventorship rules, or the law of joint inven-
torship could be made more stringent to comport again with all-or-
nothing joint ownership rides. 267
Recent scholarship focuses on the former solution: updating the
outdated framework for joint ownership. 268 This approach is attractive
because it seems simple and straightforward and because the conse-
quences of joint ownership are so harsh. 269 But tinkering with joint
ownership harbors many problems and does not actually address the
underlying difficulties with current joint inventorship rules.
There are important policy reasons for maintaining current joint
ownership rules. 27° The rule that each joint owner has rights to the
entire patent is logically equitable—if a patent contains one invention
and each joint inventor has contributed to that unitary invention, the
"amount" of contribution is not crucial, for a working invention
would not exist without either contribution. 271 This logic becomes
269 See Ethicon, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 135 F.3d 1456,1469-71 (Fed. Cir. 1998);
Carlson & Barney, supra note 12, at 266; Guledjian, supra note 224, at 1301-02; Konecny,
supra note 16, at 176.
266 See supra notes 38-110,188-221 and accompanying text.
267 Cf. supra notes 175-184,238-256 and accompanying text.
268 See Carlson & Barney, supra note 12, at 266; Guledjian, supra note 221, at 1301-02;
Konecny, supra note 16, at 176. But see Rivka Monheit, Note, The Importance of Correct Inven-
tor:ship, 7J. INTEI.I.. PROP. L. 191.222-24 (1999) (suggesting that the Ethicon problem could
be avoided if Congress or the USPTO would clarify the guidelines for joint inventorship).
269 See Carlson & Barney, supra note 12. at 266; Guledjian, supra note 224, at 1301-02;
Konecny, supra note 16, at 176; see also supra notes 139-151 and accompanying text.
27t
 See supra notes 229-234 and accompanying text.
271 See 35 U.S.C. § 121 (2000). Often, the "amount* of contribution might be thought
equivalent to the "effort" made by an inventor. See, e.g., Carlson & Barney, supra note 12, at
263. But it is unclear why the amount of time or work, or any other measure of individual
contribution, should be the indicator of inventive contribution. Some great ideas are the
product of laborious effort, some are epiphanies. Patent laws protect new, useful,
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difficult to accept. if instead the contribution of one inventor only
serves to add a particular and minor feature to an invention. 272 Then
the patent begins to look like it embodies one invention and one mi-
nor improvement to that invention, which nevertheless may be pat-
entable itself. 273 In this case, however, there are either two patentable
inventions or one patentable invention and an unnecessary feature. 274
In either circumstance, each invention can (and should) be placed in
its own separate patent if an inventor wishes to avoid the entire prob-
lem of joint ownership. 275 But even beyond this formalism, a practical
imperative supports the current doctrine: if courts currently have
trouble deciding who qualifies as a joint inventor, they will face even
greater difficulty trying to parse technical data, evaluate inevitably
conflicting expert testimony regarding which technical contribution
was more important, and determine an equitable measure of contri-
bution from each inventor. The current catch-all standard for joint
inventorship is conceptually pleasing, but difficult to apply. 276
 A judge
must. first attempt to evaluate the existence of an inventive "concep-
tion" from a lab notebook sketch or testimony, then evaluate whether
that abstract contribution is "significant" in the context of the inven-
tion.277
 And in a struggle over joint inventorship, a court must further
make decisions about the knowledge of the named inventor—for in-
stance, assuming someone suggested an idea to the named inventor,
nonobvious ideas that are turned into inventions; they do not protect effort. Sec 35 U.S.C.
§§ 101 (requiring a patentable invention to be new and useful), 102 (requiring a patent-
able invention to be novel), 103 (requiring a patentable invention to be non-obvious, and
stating "[p]atentability shall not be negatived by the manner in which the invention was
made").
272 Cf. 35 U.S.C. g 121; MANUAL, supra note 38, §§ 802-803.
273 Cf. 35	 g 121; MANUAL, supra note 38, §§ 802-803.
274 Cf, 35 U.S.C. § 121; MANum., supra note 38, §§ 802-803.
273 See 35 U.S.C. g 121; MANUAL, supra note 38, §§ 802-803. There is additional motiva-
tion, beyond mere doctrinal logic, for inventors to claim one invention per patent. It is
good and common practice to ensure that each patent claim only the invention. A patent
with "extra" features unnecessary to the invention is not infringed unless every claimed
limitation and feature of the invention—even an unnecessary one—is copied. Thus in-
fringers might be able to copy the invention claimed in a poorly drafted patent and avoid
liability by simply omitting unnecessary but claimed features. Sec Ciltsum, supra note 1,
§ 18.031 ,0, at 18-161 to 18-163; ROBERT C. FABER, LANDIS ON hiEcuANucs or CLAIM
DRArriNo § X-1 to X-3 (4th ed., release 5, 2001) [hereinafter FABER, LANots ON MEcuAN-
los]; Robert C. Faber, Pateitt Claim Writing, in FUNDANI ENTALS OF PATENT PRosEctrrioN: A
Boor CAMP FOR CLAIM DRAFTING & AM ENDM ENT lVRITING 3 (Martin Pfeffer, Chair, 2000)
[hereinafter Faber, Patent Claim Writing],
276 See supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
277 See supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
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had that inventor already conceived of the idea anyway?278 What was
the nature of their interaction?279 These are difficult questions to re-
solve accurately inside (or outside) a courtroom. 28° In addition, pat-
ent claims are not necessarily written to reflect inventive contribit-
tion. 281 There is no limit to the number of claims on an invention,
and claims may overlap or duplicate certain features in an effort to
bolster patentability arguments before the USPT0. 282 Patent counsel
may thus claim the same invention in many ways. 283 At the same time,
patent counsel might claim two inventions in one patent for efficiency
and to capture subject matter for one owner. 284 In sum, requiring or
relying on the patent prosecution process accurately and narrowly to
identify "the invention" in the patent is a dubious proposition because
patents are drafted to secure the widest possible protection for the
inventor's disclosure. Thus, very little guides courts to make easy,
efficient decisions about inventive contribution . 285 This makes solu-
tions that fraction ownership daunting to implement. 288
Even if a court could determine an ownership interest share for
an accounting, every joint owner would have the right to make and
use the patented subject matter and could license the patent without
accounting to other owners.287 Therefore, fractioning ownership of
the patent would make little difference unless the rules regarding
patentees' rights were modified. 288 But disallowing unilateral action by
joint owners is not necessarily an efficacious solution, for it would give
one joint owner the power to inhibit utilization of the patent. 289 A sin-
278 See supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
270 Sec supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
2e° See supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
281 See FABER, LANDIS ON MECHANICS, supra note 275, at X-1 to X-3: Faber, Patent Claim
Writing, supra note 275, at 14-15; cf. 35 U.S.C. § 121 (2000); MANUAl., supra note 38,
§ 706.03(k).
282 Sec MANUAL, supra note 38, § 706.03(k),
283 See id.
284 Sec supra notes 207-208 and accompanying text.
=55 See also Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and
Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1293, 1306-07, 1316-17 (1996) (arguing that
private arrangements to assess and determine rights entail lower costs than solutions in-
volving judicial machinery).
288 See supra notes 237-256 and accompanying text.
287 See supra notes 139-151 and accompanying text.
288 See supm notes 139-151 and accompanying text.
2139 See supra notes 144-145 and accompanying text. It might be more clear to say that
each party could inhibit utilization of an invention. If there are some number of constitu-
ent parts in a working invention, each owned by a separate inventor, then a single intransi-
gent owner could prevent u tiliza don of the inven don. This is so whether the ownership of
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gle party might refuse—absent yet more judicial intervention—to al-
low others to work the patent, or to license the patent to another
party seeking to commercialize the patent. 29° The transaction costs in
such a situation are extremely high, as the joint owners (some of
whom may have been antagonistic former litigants in a § 256 action to
become joint owners) are forced to bargain with one another. 291 This
result seems worse than that in Ethicon—a single joint. inventor still
wields considerable power, but now can act to block any commercial
development of the patent, a public disservice.
In addition to the policy rationales for maintaining current joint
ownership rules, Congressional intent ought to set priority in the in-
evitable tradeoff between equity and pragmatism that accompanies
the determination of patent rights. 292
 The clear intent of the 1984
amendments to § 116 focused on promoting large-scale, team-
oriented collaborative research. 293
 Tints, collaboration and collegiality
among researchers ought to be the primary consideration in address-
ing the problem Et/ icon presents. 294
To this end, heretofore proposed amendments to the law of joint.
ownership seem only tangentially related to the essential problem:
joint inventorship law stifles collaboration among large research
teams and unnecessarily involves lawyers in the inventive process. 245
They muddy the legal landscape, preventing inventors from knowing
when rights accrue and when bargaining is required. 296
 In short, in
the context. of Ethicon, they keep Dr. Yoon unaware that. he should ne-
gotiate with his assistant for patent rights. 297 So, if a research team is
unsure, because of the legal consequences, whether to involve an out-
side collaborator, they will hardly be comforted by the suggestion that
the outside collaborator might own only some unknown fraction, pos-
sibly the crucial fraction, of the resulting invention. 298 They will be
only minimally assuaged by the suggestion that, via involuntary join-
der, they can force that outside collaborator to join their lawsuits
a single patent has been fractioned among multiple owners or ownership has been frac•
tioned into multiple patents.
200 See supra notes 144-145 and accompanying text.
201 See supra notes 144-145,248-251 and accompanying text.
292 Sec so pra notes 281-286 and accompanying text.
293 CI supra notes 38-110 and accompanying text.
294 Sec supra notes 211-221 and accompanying text.
29' See supra notes 168-221 and accompanying text.
206 See supra notes 168-221 and accompanying text.
297 See supra notes 168-221 and accompanying text.
298 See supra notes 211-221 and accompanying text.
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against infringers (assuming the collaborator has not granted the in-
fringers a license). 299 With these approaches remains the basic issue:
fear of having a joint inventor named on the patent."° That fear
originates from uncertainty about the law of joint inventorship, not
the law of joint ownership."'
Furthermore, amending the law of joint ownership seems to
maintain troublesome legal involvement in research and develop-
ment."2 It does not address or eliminate the initial reason for the le-
gal presence (to identify possible joint inventors), but instead may
increase the lawyer's role."9 Patent counsel, it seems, need continued
contact with research teams to determine not only who contributed to
an invention but what pieces they contributed."4 This is a point that
did not seem to bother the Ethicon court, as the majority dismissed
Judge Newman's dissent by commenting that "where inventors choose
to cooperate in the inventive process, their joint inventions may be-
come joint property without some express agreement to the con-
trary:305 This approach also increases legal intrusion in another
way—if each part of an invention is up for grabs in a piecemeal joint
ownership approach, control of patent prosecution becomes vital. 306
This, in effect, creates another battleground for competing inventor-
ship interests." 7 In sum, amending joint ownership law may address
the in-court effects of the Ethicon problem, but amending the law of
299 See supra notes 211-221 and accompanying text.
3" See Sung, supra note 15, at 435; see also supra notes 211-221 and accompanying text.
391 See supra notes 211-221 and accompanying text.
902 See supra notes 202-210 and accompanying text. Some have argued that legal in-
volvement in this area is needed because collaborators cannot always bargain efficiently
themselves. See Dreyfuss, supra note 14, at 1165,1172.
" See supra notes 202-210 and accompanying text.
304 Sec LAW AND STRATEGY, supra note 204, at 138; SEInEL, supra note 204, at 6; Rega-
lado, supra note 15, at B4; see also supra notes 202-210 and accompanying text. A cynic
might predict that allowing each part of an invention to be owned separately will lead to a
separate legal fight over each part of the invention.
305 EilliC011, 135 F.3d at 1466. Besides inviting the law into the lab, there are at least two
other issues worth noting about this argument: first, Dr, \bon apparently did not believe
he was entering into a cooperative and inventive process with Choi, or even that the proc-
ess would bear patentable fruit; second, as inventors become aware of this standard, it is
likely to inhibit choices such inventors make, the likely victim being collaboration. Sec
Dreyfuss, supra note 14, at 1166 (arguing that collaboration holds particular social value in
today's research, so that private, self-inflicted choices concerning inventorship arrange-
ments nevertheless inflict significant social costs which the law must deal with); Dale L.
Carlson & James R. Barney, Illto Owns What's in Your Patent?, INTELL. PROP. TODAY, June
1998, at 8 n.15.
300 See supra notes 207-214 and accompanying text.
397 See supra notes 207-214 and accompanying text.
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joint inventorship better addresses both the in-court and out-of-court.
effects. 3°8
B. Efficacious Joint bruentorslup Rules
The goals of joint inventorship rules include equity, 309 ease of
administration , 310
 and promotion of collegial and collaborative team
research. 3 " This last goal may be further broken-down: collaboration
requires equitable rules, as potential collaborators must feel that their
inventive efforts will be rewarded. 312 But it also requires something
more—that each potential inventor know the threshold for achieving
joint inventorship status set by joint inventorship law. 313 Clear, pre-
dictable rules about the legal requirements for inventorship status
allow parties to negotiate within known bounds and find agreeable
terms on which to collaborate. 314
 Though parties may not know
whether their work will result in a patentable product, clear joint in-
ventorship rules at least allow them to assess the likelihood of a par-
ticular person becoming a joint inventor. 315
 In the absence of clear
rules, there is uncertainty about the potential rights accruing to a par-
ticular collaborator—this inhibits any agreement on terms of collabo-
ration. 316
 Thus, an additional and most important goal for joint inven-
torship rules is to provide clear rules that are predictable in
application (this goal is hereafter termed "clarity"). 317
Prior to the 1984 amendments, some courts embraced the idea
of an "all-claims" rule for joint inventorship. 318
 This rule represents
one extreme in a range of possible rules, as measured by equity, ease
306 Sec supra notes 192-221 and accompanying text.
3°9 Sec supra notes 174-183 and accompanying text; cf. Ethicon. 135 F.3d at 1469-71.
31(/ See supra notes 281-284 and accompanying text.
311
 See supm notes 292-294 and accompanying text.
312 See supra notes 71-77,211-223 and accompanying text.
315 Sec supra notes 211-223 and accompanying text.
s" See Dreyfuss, supra note 14, at 1169 (discussing Suzanne Scotchmer, Protecting Early
Innovators: Should Second Generation Products Be Patentable?, 27 RAND J. ECON. 322 (1994)
(advocating ex ante collaboration agreements as the most efficient way to promote creative
work)); ef supra notes 211-223 and accompanying text.
316 Sec Dreyfuss, supra note 14, at 1169.
316 Sec id.; cf. supra notes 211-223 and accompanying text.
317
 Sec Dreyfuss, supra note 14, at 1169; cf. supra notes 190-223 and accompanying text.
See generally Robert W. Harris. Conceptual Specificity as a Factor in Determination of Inventorship,
67 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFT. Soc'• 315,315 (1985) (proposing "degree of specificity as a
factor in determining inventorship). Using the "degree of specificity" as a yardstick for
inventive contribution clarifies joint inventorship determinations by requiring an inventive
contribution be a specific portion of the invention. Sec Harris, supra, at 315.
318 See supra notes 100-110 and accompanying text.
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of administration, promotion of collaboration, and clarity. 319 The rule
is very easy to administer but inflexible and so prone to misrepresent
the importance of the contribution from each purported joint inven-
tor. 32° It seems to inhibit collaboration, as a person might be hesitant
to join a product in which that person contributes significantly but
could earn no patent rights. 321 The current state of the law, essentially
that contribution to "any claim" for really any part of any claim), is at
the opposite end of that continuum. 322 The rule is easy to administer,
but is inaccurate and inequitable in assessing inventive contribu-
tion.323 Its low threshold creates fear about an Ethicon-type scenario.324
Neither of these rules are particularly clear in their application until
the patent is written and the claims defined; at the research stage, any
team member could or could not be a joint inventor. 325
Efficacious rules for joint inventorship may achieve equity by
avoiding extremes of claim counting, refraining from one catch-all
standard for all fact patterns, and instead relying on case by case
analysis. 326 Such rules may achieve clarity if tailored to the context in
which the invention was made. 327 Such rules will be easy to administer
if they use a bright-line standard, or at least a specific set of factors, for
each situation. 328 Joint inventorship rules classed by inventive entity,
inventive context, and technical field satisfy these criteria.329 These
rules might be thought of as entries in a table or matrix, with a sepa-
313 CI SUM notes 100-110 and accompanying text.
329 CI supra notes 100-110 and accompanying text.
321 q supra notes 100-110 and accompanying text. Indeed, under this rule, control of
claim drafting is paramount: a key feature of the invention could simply be written out of
just one claim so as to usurp the feature for the named inventor of the remaining claims.
CI supra notes 100-110 and accompanying text.
322 Cf. supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
323 Sec Ethicon, 135 F.3d at 1469-71; Sung, supra note 15, at 435-36; see also supra notes
174-187 and accompanying text.
324 See Ethicon, 135 F.3d at 1469-71; Sung, supra note 15, at 435-36; sec also supra notes
174-187 and accompanying text.
323 Sec supra notes 174-187 and accompanying text; cf. supra notes 100-110 and ac-
companying text.
326 See Ethicon, 135 F.3d at 1469-71; sec also supra notes 174-183,254-256 and accom-
panying text.
327 Sec supra notes 281-284 and accompanying text.
328 Cf. supra notes 281-286 and accompanying text.
323 For example, courts have applied the rule of simultaneous conception and reduc-
tion to practice to experimental sciences because those sciences often develop and refine
ideas, perhaps significantly, in testing a hypothesis. See supra note 42. Predictive sciences,
however, use the rule by which conception and reduction to practice are separate steps. See
supra note 42. The Federal Circuit might consider inventorship questions in a more cus-
tomized fashion, as well.
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rate set of legally important factors for every common class or situa-
tion existing in typical research environments.
For instance, distinct inventive entities include corporate re-
search teams, research partners, researchers and assistants, faculty
and postdoctoral students, and hired collaborators or consultants.
Inventive context is closely related to inventive entity: was the inven-
tion a product of large corporate research and development teams or
two inventors in a garage, a product of a single meeting or an ex-
tended agreement to collaborate? The following factors may be de-
veloped based on these distinctions. If large research teams are in-
volved, a court should require less evidence of contribution from each
team member."° This is not to say that each team member must not
"contribute to conception." If a team holds large meetings, performs
research, and banters about ideas in a laboratory setting, then courts
should require evidence of each member's contribution before con-
cluding that each team member, in the context. of that collaboration,
did contribute to the final product." 1
 At the same time, in this re-
search-team context, Congressional intent ought to control. Courts
should raise a presumption that every inventor in that research team
contributed.532
 On the other hand, if there are only two partners in-
volved in a research endeavor, then the likelihood of each partner
contributing seems greater but depends closely on the relationship of
the parties, including who initiated collaboration, or if the relation-
ship is one of supervisor and subordinate." 3
 The latter situation,
given the rule that following directions does not constitute contribu-
tion, ought to give rise to a presumption of non-inventorship." 4 Two
pertinent factors thus are the size of the inventive entity and the rela-
tionship of inventive entities. Another factor implicit in this analysis is
the length of time during which collaboration took place, a short.
meeting less likely to produce (though not incapable of producing)
joint contributive effort titan a long period of cooperation." 5
 The na-
3" See supra notes 70, 90-98 and accompanying text.
331 See sepia notes 70, 90-98 and accompanying text.
332 See SUPM notes 71-76 and accompanying text.
333 Compair Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Procter & Gamble Distrib. Co., 973 F.2d 911, 916—
17 (Fed. Cir. 1992), and Gen. Motors Corp. v. Toyota Motor Co., 467 F. Stipp. 1142, 1150-
51 (S.D. Ohio 1979) (team research), with Panno v. blab Corp., 155 F.3d 1344, 1351 (Fed.
Cir. 1998) (individual researchers), and Ethical, 135 F.3d at 1456, and Monsanto Co, v.
Kamp, 269 F. Stipp. 818, 824 (D.D.C. 1967).
334 Cf supra note 52 and accompanying text.
335
 Cf. Kimberly-Clath, 973 F.2d at 916-17 (requiring collaboration between joint inven-
tors).
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Lure of the relationship between researchers should constitute an-
other factor: a sales visit is less likely to produce deep inventive col-
laboration than a protracted partnership between two individuals. 336
Also, the existence of a formal contract may specify certain employee
duties that may or may not be relevant to the research. If the job de-
scription is to effect instructions given by a supervising researcher,
then an inventive contribution is less likely than a simple following of
orders. 337
Finally, the field of research is pertinent. 338 Those who conduct
experiments and tests in the pharmaceutical industry, for instance,
are more likely to contribute to conception (especially under a theory
of simultaneous conception and reduction to practice) than those
who perform the same function in the predictive sciences, which
make extensive use of modeling and computer analysis.'" Contribu-
tion to conception in an esoteric field entailing years of education is
simply less likely for those without that background, whereas an in-
vention concerning a non-technical idea is much more accessible.")
Thus, the factor of technical complexity ought to be considered in
assessing inventorship.34 i
Using these factors, and others courts may develop, it is apparent
that the amount and nature of collaboration can influence a court's
joint inventorship analysis. 342 This result. is desirable because it allows
a research team to know clearly that if it maintains limited contact.
with an outside consultant (for instance) it will be that much harder
(though not impossible) for the consultant to bring a successful § 256
action on any resulting patent. 343 If the amount of contact increases
beyond a particular level, as defined by developed precedent in this
matrix organization, the research team should know that it should
negotiate with the consultant as a potential joint inventor, possibly for
99P
	 sq. notes 65-70 and accompanying text.
"7 See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
338 See supra note 45.
339 Sec supra note 45.
340 Cf. supra note 45 and accompanying text. 111 conception is defined as the inventor's
mental grasp of a complete and operative invention, including its theory of operation,
then those with more education, experience, or training in a particular field would seem
to have an inherent advantage in understanding and formulating, and therefore legally
conceiving of, an invention in their particular field of expertise. See Ethicon, 135 F.3d at
1460.
"I See supra note 343.
342 No doubt courts consider, implicitly or intuitively, some of these factors already, but
not consistently or explicitly as is needed for clear rules.
343 cf supra notes 211-221 and accompanying text.
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an assignment. of rights. 344 If these factors were entries in a matrix of
possible research fact patterns, and if the judiciary were sufficiently
consistent and clear about their relative importance, one could
choose a particular type , of situation and understand which factors
control, in a semi-custom fashion.
These factors, admittedly, cannot be developed completely in the
abstract. But the Federal Circuit could begin to create multiple rules
as cases come before it, filling in an abstract matrix, instead of relying
on the usual "contribution to conception" muddiness which suppos-
edly guides all decisions in all fact patterns. 345
 The Federal Circuit
could create as many or as few factors or rules as needed. This ap-
proach does not necessarily entail an amendment to § 11 6. 546
 That
section imposes only negative criteria—circumstances that. do not dis-
qualify one from inventorship.347 It does not prohibit the imposition
of particular positive criteria unless they impinge on the negative cri-
teria in the text of the statute. 348
 For instance, as long as the Federal
Circuit does not require joint inventors each to contribute the same
amount to an invention, or to contribute to every claim in the patent,
additional requirements are not in conflict with the statute. 319
Such an approach should not mean the standard for joint inven-
torship would vary (at least any more than it currently does), or that it
would espouse a particular bias against certain roles in the inventive
process. 35° It would allow a court to customize the factors it uses for
each type of situation, however, and thereby create more consistent,
more understandable, and more predictable results. 3" Ultimately, the
goals of an efficacious joint inventorship standard are in tension: total
equity requires tailored solutions, whereas perfect clarity requires
bright-line tests, and the promotion of collaborative research remains
a mix of the two. The proposed matrix approach is a hybrid solution,
and perhaps a compromise, which may come closest to fulfilling all
goals.
"4 CI supra notes 211-221 and accompanying text,
"'See supra notes 38-55 and accompanying text.
346
 See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
547
 Sec supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
346
 See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
343 See SUPJV notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
s'° See supra notes 174-183 and accompanying text; el Ethicon,
The goal of equity is arguably better served by judicial case-by-case
inventorship law rather than a rigid, bright-line statutory enactment.
551
 cf supra notes 218-221 and accompanying text (noting that
entific community is largely driven by a lack of stable guidelines).
135 F.3d at 1469-71.
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uncertainty in the sci-
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This approach has the benefit of providing a solution tailored in
scope to the fact pattern of Ethicon.352 If joint inventorship problems
occur primarily within the researcher-technical assistant environment,
then joint inventorship rules of this sort can specifically target that
situation.353 In 2000, over seventy-eight percent of issued patents were
assigned to one owner, typically an employer, avoiding the Ethicon
scenario.354 The appropriate solution for a researcher-technical assis-
tant environment may not be appropriate for other situations that
occur in the development of patentable work under the aegis of one
employer. 355
Finally, development of joint inventorship case law also has ad-
vantages over a statutory amendment. Of the goals for joint inventor-
ship rules discussed above, clarity seems suited to statutory reform,
particularly if Congress were able to provide a definitive list of criteria
for joint inventorship that would bind courts:356 But this approach
harbors a number of pitfalls worth noting.
First, it is important to recognize that the Federal Circuit occu-
pies a jurisprudentially unique role. 357 In 1982, Congress created it
largely because of differing standards in patent law among the federal
appellate courts:358 The new court's charge was, and remains, to mold
a uniform body of patent law:358 Thus, in clarifying joint inventorship
standards, the Federal Circuit is actually fulfilling its assigned mis-
sion. 380 Accordingly, Congress has already exhibited a reluctance to
552 Cf. supra notes 152-173 and accompanying text. The twists and turns of the Ethicon
fact pattern are not necessarily common.
355 Cf. supra notes 152-173 and accompanying text.
354 TECH, ASSESSMENT & FORECAST BRANCH, U.S, PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE,
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT AND FORECAST REpoicr A1-1 (2001), lutp://untvw.ttspto.gov/
web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/apat.pdf (over seventy-eight percent of patents of United
States origin granted in 2000 were assigned to a corporation). As the value of intellectual
property increases in both monetary worth and prestige, and as more and more inventive
work is done in a collaborative setting, many institutions, from universities to journals, are
becoming more careful to order their policies towards collaborators. See also Dre)fuss, su-
pra note 14, at 1184-89.
355 Cf. supra notes 152-173 and accompanying text.
356
 See supra notes 305-311 and accompanying text.
357 See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164,96 Stat. 25; S.
REP. No. 97-275, at 2-6 (1981), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11,12-16.
358 See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982; S. REP. No. 97-275, at 2-6, reprinted in
1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11,12-16.
559 See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982; S. REP. No. 97-275, at 2-6, reprinted in
1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11,12-16.
56° See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982; S. REP. No. 97-275, at 2-6, reprinted in
1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 12-16. Indeed, before enacting the 1984 amendments, Congress
heard testimony recommending that the contemporary problems with joint inventorship
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enact particular positive criteria for inventorship. 361 It codified only
negative criteria in the 1984 amendments, even though the same
cases from which it drew those criteria also contained positive crite-
ria.362 At. the dine, the new Federal Circuit had just begun to function
and Congress wanted to prevent, it from moving in an unfavorable di-
rection based on contemporary case 1aw. 363 Now that the Federal Cir-
cuit sits with over twenty years of precedent, Congress should exhibit
even greater deference to its specific expertise on this issue. 36 •
Furthermore, although statutory codification of inventorship
standards could embrace bright-line tests and thus provide clarity,
they would inevitably appear rigid. 366 If equity is an important goal,
then a rigid system that mechanically omits or includes inventors does
not appear promising. 36° This is especially problematic when consid-
ering the myriad of plausible fact patterns that could culminate in
inventive conception. 367
 Defining a single standard would be as chal-
lenging as defining conception itself and would likely bind future fact.
patterns to rigid criteria. It is questionable why an inventor should
have to conform to any inflexible statutory standard, when the patent
code already sensibly indicates that "[p]atentability shall not be nega-
tived by the manner in which the invention was made." 368 And if the
promotion of collegial and collaborative research is a goal, then a
statute would have to strike a delicate balance: if the bar were set too
high, collaboration would suffer as incentives to participate in group
doctrine be left to contextual court analysis. Hearings, supra note 76, at 157-58 (statement
of Professor Herbert F. SeInvarz from the University of Pennsylvania). Professor Schwarz,
testifying before the House Subcommittee, explained: To the extent that the proper in-
terpretation of § 116 is not well-settled, any disagreement can be resolved by the new
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit." Id. at 158. In hindsight, Professor Schwarz's
approach would seem to have avoided the statutory bind the Federal Circuit confronted in
Ethical'. See id.
361 See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
362 See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
363 See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
364 Sec Hearings, supra note 77, at 157-58 (statement of Professor Herbert F. Schwarz
advocating that Congress defer to the Federal Circuit to create appropriate precedent on
joint inventorship).
565 cy: supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text (noting that the original 1984
amendments were codified precisely to constrain courts). On this issue, see also Hearings.
supra note 77, at 157-58 (statement of Professor Herbert F. Schwarz),
366 Sec supra note 309 and accompanying text.
367 A simple review of cases cited in this Note reveals invention springing both from
many years of research by engineers who may never have tnet, as in General Motors, 467 F.
Supp, at 1150-51, and from a relatively benign call to a salesman, as in Paw', 155 F.3d at
1346.
368 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000).
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research diminished;30 if the bar were too low, then of course joint.
inventors gain nothing new.
Finally, rigid bright-line tests best serve the goal of easy admini-
stration, but not necessarily much more than a matrix approach
would. 37° A statutory amendment, then, really only satisfies one of the
four goals for joint. inventorship standards. In addition, overly rigid
criteria, at an extreme, could run afoul of the constitutional and
statutory provisions for inventorship. 371 The text of the Constitution
seems to embrace a theory of natural rights for inventors, granting
Congress the power to secure "for limited Times to Authors and In-
ventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discover-
ies."372 In 35 U.S.C. § 101, Congress has effected that power by provid-
ing that "Lwlhoever invents or discovers ... may obtain a patent."
Omitting true inventors from patents because their actions do not fit
a preconceived notion of the inventive process is objectionable as an-
tithetical to this basic principle of awarding actual inventors rights in
their works. 373
CONCLUSION
Currently, the law of joint inventorship provides a low and uncer-
tain threshold for inventorship. Its vague standard fosters inequities
when applied to all-or-nothing joint ownership rules, provides oppor-
tunities for dubious legal defenses, and inhibits collaboration among
researchers. Ideally, fixing these problems involves modification of
the rules for joint inventorship, not joint ownership. Amending the
rules for joint inventorship is more practical than amending those for
joint ownership and addresses both in-court and out-of-court effects.
Revised joint inventorship standards should be equitable, easy to ad-
369 See Sung, supra note 15, at 421,435; see also supra notes 311-312 and accompanying
text.
37° q Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164,96 Stat. 25, re-
printed in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 12-16; Hearings, supra note 77, at 157-58 (statement of
Professor Herbert F. Schwarz). By creating the Federal Circuit to handle patent law rather
than enact uniform statutory reform, Congress seemed to choose the judicial fix over the
statutory. At the same tune, Congress did not seem to have any concerns about the ease
with which the new court would administer the law.
m Sec U.S. Coma. art. I. § 8, cl. 8; 35 U.S.C. § 101; Fasse, supra note 1. at 155-56 n.13
(explaining that only actual, true inventors, as opposed to those who exploit the ideas of
other, have natural rights in their inventions).
372 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8; see Fasse, supra note 1, at 155-56 n.13.
373 See U.S. CoNs'r. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; 35 U.S.C. § 101; sec Fasse, supra note 1, at 155-56
11,13 (explaining that actual inventors have natural rights in their inventions and reviewing
framer's intent on the issue).
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minister, promote collaboration, and most of all, clear. Clear stan-
dards aid collaborative, patent-producing research (the kind that.
Congress intended to promote with the 1984 amendments) because
they allow parties to assess the potential for inventorship rights in a
given collaborative environment. The Federal Circuit. might effect
these goals by using a matrix approach. The court can develop multi-
ple rules for joint inventorship, as cases demand, in which the rules
for determining inveniorsliip are specific and adapted to contextual
concerns, such as inventive entity, inventive context, and technical
field. Such an approach is in harmony with the joint inventorship
statute, Congressional intent, and public interest in the promotion of
collegial, collaborative, and productive research.
JOSHUA MATT
ORDER THROUGH HEIN!
Get your missing back volumes and issues
through Hein!
We have obtained the entire back stock, electronic,
reprint and microform rights to . .
Boston College
Law Review
Complete sets to date are available now!
We can also furnish single volumes and issues!
BACK ISSUES ALSO AVAILABLE
IN HEINON-LINEI
http://heinonline.org
Fred D. Rothman & Cu.
Anne-heb colol(bndery
Fred 0. Damn!, & Ca. 
Primus Inter Pares
WILLIAM S. HEIN 8s CO., INC.
Law Publisher /Serial &Subscription Agent / Micropublisher
New & Used Law Books / Preservation Printer / Bookbinder
1285 Main Street, Buffalo, New York 14209
(716) 882-2600 • TOLL FREE (800) 828-7571 • Fax (716) 883-8100
E- Mail maikaiwahein.com • Web Site www.wahein.com
